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Abstract
We investigate the causes of time-series fluctuations in the propensity to pay dividends,
including the post-1978 decline documented by Fama and French (2001). We consider
explanations based on fluctuations in dividend clienteles, agency problems, information
asymmetries, executive stock options, catering incentives, tax code awareness, and
short-lived idiosyncratic factors. To evaluate these explanations, we conduct three
styles of analysis. First, we count and classify influences on the propensity to pay that
were noted in the financial press. Second, we examine time-series relationships
between the propensity to pay and proxies for the driving influences in the candidate
explanations. Third, we assess whether the candidate explanations are theoretically
compatible with related time-series patterns involving dividend policy. Overall, the
results are most consistent with the catering explanation. Notably, catering incentives,
as measured by the stock market "dividend premium," roughly line up with the four
trends in the propensity to pay between 1963 and 2000 and are able to account for the
observed magnitude of the post-1978 decline. There is also evidence that idiosyncratic
factors, including the Nixon-era dividend controls and the recent growth in options,
affected the propensity to pay in specific periods.
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1I. Introduction
In an important paper, Fama and French (2001) document a major shift in dividend
policy. In 1978, 67% of their Compustat sample pays dividends. But by 1999, only 21% pays
dividends. They trace part of this decline to a change in the sample. In recent years, more firms
have low profits and high growth opportunities and thus would not be expected to pay dividends.
However, even after accounting for this composition effect, they find a large decline in the
residual “propensity to pay dividends.” In this sense, dividends are disappearing.
Although this post-1978 disappearance has understandably received the most attention, it
is important to realize that dividends have disappeared and reappeared before. In fact, since 1963
there have been four distinct trends in the propensity to pay dividends. These earlier cycles are
illustrated in Figure 1, where we apply the Fama and French methodology for estimating the
propensity to pay to the earlier Compustat data.
The top panels in the figure show the actual percentage of the sample that pays dividends
in each year. They also show the percentage of firms that are expected to be payers, given
prevailing firm characteristics.1 The propensity to pay dividends is defined as the difference
between the actual percentage and the expected, and it plotted in the middle panels. The four
distinct trends are apparent. There is an increase in the propensity to pay from 1963 through
1966-68 (depending on how exactly one measures PTP), a decrease until roughly 1972-74, a
rebound through 1977, and then the decrease through the end of the sample. Each of these trends
involves hundreds if not thousands of firms.
                                                
1 Readers unfamiliar with their methodology should refer to Appendix 1. In brief, Fama and French fit a firm-level
logit model of dividend payment over 1963-1977, and then evaluate this fixed model at the characteristics that
prevail in a given year in order to estimate the expected percentage of payers for that year.
2Fama and French present the fluctuations in the propensity to pay dividends as a puzzle
to be explained. In this paper, we attempt to shed light on their cause (or causes) by conducting a
comprehensive empirical analysis. We consider six general candidate explanations. Each one, by
necessity, posits a time-varying influence on dividends that is separate from firm and economic
characteristics. In addition to these general explanations, we stay open to the possibility that at
specific points in time, idiosyncratic influences played cameo roles.
Our six general candidate explanations are as follows. Explanations based on (1) agency
costs or (2) asymmetric information propose that the nature of contracting changes over time,
requiring changes in dividend policy. Explanations that view dividends as a response to investor
demand include (3) clientele equilibrium theories in which changes in dividends are closely tied
to changes in the size of dividend clienteles, and the related (4) catering theory in which they are
influenced by changes in the relative stock prices of dividend payers and nonpayers. We also
consider the possibility that variation in the use of (5) executive stock option compensation may
have created a bias against paying dividends, and the notion that (6) it has simply taken time for
managers to appreciate the tax disadvantages of dividends. Fama and French suggest some of
these hypotheses in their conclusion. Others are drawn from recent research, or from traditional
theories of dividends. To be comprehensive, we consider as many explanations as possible. And
because we are not aware of any single, definitive empirical test, we evaluate them from as many
perspectives as possible.
Our empirical analysis begins with a review of historical New York Times articles about
dividends. This allows us to establish context, and to flag any institutional changes that financial
writers linked to dividend policy. It also allows us to verify that our list of general candidate
explanations is complete, by seeing whether the media makes reference to some pervasive
3influence that falls outside their scope. We start by reviewing the fifteen hundred abstracts for
articles that appear between 1969 and 2001 and mention dividends in some fashion. From these
abstracts we identify one hundred articles which, when read in their full text, allow us to catalog
specific references to non-characteristics influences on dividend policy. We classify each of
those references according to which of our candidate explanations that it most nearly invokes.
We also take note of references to idiosyncratic institutional changes.
Under the working assumption that sophisticated financial writers will take note of the
pervasive influences on dividends, this classification also allows for a rough horse race for our
candidate explanations. That is, we find that the Times makes numerous references to tax-based
clienteles, catering to investor sentiment for dividends, and slow learning about taxes. In
contrast, our other candidate theories receive few media citations, however oblique. Of course,
this style of analysis has obvious limitations. It is most useful when considered in conjunction
with other approaches.
We then proceed to a standard time series analysis. We assemble proxies for tax- and
transaction cost-based dividend clienteles, asymmetric information, executive stock options, and
catering incentives. Then we try to match these variables up with the propensity to pay, visually
and through regression specifications. The results are intriguing. We can visually match most of
our proxies up with at least one and sometimes two of the time trends in the propensity to pay,
probably just by chance in some cases. But our proxy for catering incentives, the dividend
premium variable from Baker and Wurgler (2002), lines up with all four trends in the propensity
to pay in Figure 1. This is our most striking finding. The propensity to pay increases when the
dividend premium is positive, and declines when it is negative, as catering predicts.
4In fact, the dividend premium variable can, as an empirical matter, solve the disappearing
dividends puzzle (the post-1978 decline) in the particular sense that it is posed by Fama and
French. In other words, if the propensity to pay is fit to the dividend premium in the early years
of the sample, and then this regression model is used to make an out-of-sample forecast for 1978
and beyond, then the forecast fits well with the actual propensity to pay. No unexplained decline
remains. This is our second most striking finding.
Our final style of analysis is a discussion of the extent to which our candidate
explanations can incorporate, in principle, other time-series patterns in the dividend data. In
particular, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2002) find that the firms that paid particularly
small dividends were the most likely to omit them in recent years; Bagwell and Shoven (1989)
and Grullon and Michaely (2002) document that the propensity to repurchase has increased even
as the propensity to pay dividends has declined; and results in Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggest
that changes in the propensity to pay dividends will be inversely related to the future relative
stock returns of payers and nonpayers, which we confirm. We focus on these three patterns
because they do not involve firm characteristics in any obvious way, and so would seem likely to
be caused by the same forces that influence the propensity to pay. The capacity to incorporate
them, in theory, therefore represents another type of “out-of-sample” test for our candidate
explanations. Our discussion of these patterns is detailed and hard to summarize, but points us to
the conclusion that a catering explanation requires the least amount of theoretical stretching to
incorporate all three of these patterns.
There is reason to believe that a handful of other forces have played cameo roles at
various times. For example, there is circumstantial evidence that Nixon’s moral suasions against
dividend growth had some effect between 1971 and 1974 – this influence on dividends was often
5cited by the Times, and this is the one period where the propensity to pay declines even though
the dividend premium was positive. In addition, the results of Fenn and Liang (2001) and
Grullon and Michaely (2002) strongly suggest that stock options and repurchases have
propagated the post-1978 disappearance, although we can find no evidence that these factors
initiated that particular decline. We end the paper with a highly stylized narrative of the forces
that seem to drive the propensity to pay between 1963 and 2000. This draws our analysis
together into a useful summary, and represents our answer to the question posed in the title.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II outlines our candidate explanations. Section III
reviews New York Times references to non-characteristics influences on dividends. Section IV
documents time series relationships between the propensity to pay and various proxy variables.
Section V discusses the ability of the candidate explanations to incorporate other non-
characteristics trends in the data. Section VI summarizes the analysis.
II. Candidate explanations
Our goal is to uncover the economic forces behind the trends in Figure 1. To get started,
we develop a list of potential explanations based on existing theories of dividends. Roughly
speaking, this leads to one entry per major theory of dividends. The common theme is that time
variation in the propensity to pay is driven by corresponding variation in whatever underlying
imperfection or inefficiency that the theory uses to motivate dividends.
Our focus on underlying economic forces means that, for example, we do not view “share
repurchases” as a candidate explanation. Variation in market imperfections can induce both an
increase in repurchases and a decrease in dividends, in which case an increase in repurchases
would not be a meaningful economic “cause” of a decrease in dividends. Instead, the interesting
6question becomes what imperfection has changed to induce both trends.2 With this perspective in
mind, we discuss trends in repurchases in section V.B.
Table 1 summarizes the six general explanations that we consider. The list includes the
most prominent of the non-characteristics influences on dividends suggested in the literature,
including the hypotheses offered in the conclusion of Fama and French (2001). It also includes
some less formal theories suggested by recent work. Where possible, we state the explanations in
a general form so that they can encompass institutional changes, such as tax code changes.
Nevertheless, episodes such as the Nixon-era controls are a reminder that some idiosyncratic
events will inevitably fall outside their scope. Such events are not listed in Table 1 because they
are not general explanations, but they still need to be accounted for when studying specific eras.
(In Section III, we review historical articles in the financial press in part to catalog such events.)
We outline each candidate below.
A. Agency
Easterbrook (1984) views dividends as a corporate governance device that helps to keep
managers close to the capital markets. In a similar spirit, Jensen (1986) prefers debt because it
provides less discretion. Under this view, dividends could be disappearing (for example) because
more effective governance mechanisms have appeared as substitutes.3 Jensen (1989), Kaplan
(1997) and Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) argue that U.S. corporate governance institutions have
                                                
2 Grullon and Michaely (2002) suggest that SEC Rule 10b-18, which defined a safe harbor for open market
repurchases and was introduced in 1983, represents an exogenous institutional change that may have influenced both
dividend and repurchase trends. Figure 1 shows that the latest trend in dividend payment was already well underway
by 1983, however, so “Rule 10b-18” cannot be a general candidate explanation for variations in the propensity to
pay, or even this last trend. Rather, we view it as one of several interesting institutional shifts to keep in mind when
studying particular periods in the data.
3 Note that time variation in the level of free cash flow itself, holding governance constant, is not an explanation for
time varying propensity to pay. Free cash flow is a firm characteristic, closely accounted for in the Fama and French
(2001) firm-level model of dividend payment (through the market-to-book and profitability terms). Changes in the
level of free cash flow would not directly affect the propensity to pay. What is required is some change in the
contracting environment that is separate from firm or economic conditions.
7indeed changed substantially over the past two decades, generally for the better. While the recent
wave of corporate scandals indicates that the system is still very far from perfect, perhaps these
changes have generally reduced the need to control agency problems through dividends.
B. Information asymmetry
Ross (1977), Battacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock (1985),
among others, propose that managers use dividends as signals of profitability. In some models,
the tax disadvantage of dividends provides the necessary cost of signaling; in others, the cost is
foregone investment opportunities. These models predict that dividends would be used less often
(for example) if the information gap between managers and investors has narrowed, or if
substitute signaling mechanisms have become more effective. More specifically, information
gaps may have been narrowed by information technology, or by the emergence of institutional
investors with stronger incentives to gather information. Amihud and Li (2002) find that the
average announcement effect of dividend changes has decreased over the past few decades and
attribute this to increased stock ownership by institutions.
C. Stock options
When executives hold stock options that are not dividend protected, they have a personal
incentive not to pay dividends, as pointed out by Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker (1989).4 Lambert
et al., Jolls (1998), Weisbenner (1999), Fenn and Liang (2001), and Kahle (2002) find that stock
options are indeed associated with lower dividends and higher repurchases. Given the recent
explosion in option compensation documented by Yermack (1995) and Hall and Liebman
(1997), these results point to executive options as a candidate for at least the most recent trend in
the propensity to pay.
                                                
4 Of course, the net incentive is ambiguous if paying dividends increases share price for some other reason, for
example through signaling.
8D. Clientele equilibrium
A disappearance in dividends could also reflect a decline in investor demand for
dividends per se. The clientele equilibrium theory starts from the observation that some
institutional imperfection causes some investor clienteles to rationally demand dividends.
Changes in this imperfection cause changes in the relative demands of pro- and anti-dividend
clienteles, which in turn induce changes in the supply of dividends in equilibrium. According to
the vision outlined in Miller and Modigliani (1961) and articulated more fully by Black and
Scholes (1974), changes in demand are matched closely by changes in supply so that all
clienteles are kept equally satisfied on the margin. Thus, competition among firms maintains a
Miller (1977)-style equilibrium in which a nontrivial premium on shares with a particular
dividend policy never arises. Corporate finance textbooks focus on the prescriptive implication
of the clientele equilibrium view, that dividend policy is relevant in the aggregate but not at the
firm level.
Miller and Modigliani and Black and Scholes identify several types of imperfections that
can lead to dividend clienteles. Clienteles can arise for tax reasons. For example, dividends are
tax advantaged for taxable corporations, but tax disadvantaged for most individuals. Transaction
costs can motivate clienteles when some investors (e.g., retirees) use shareholdings to finance
ongoing consumption – the transaction costs of making homemade dividends every quarter
might lead them to prefer shares that just send liquidity in the mail. Institutional investment
constraints can also lead to clienteles. Endowed institutions that by charter can spend only from
the income component of returns, and institutional investors for whom dividend-paying stocks
9are easier to defend as “prudent” holdings to an investment committee, are examples.5 In
summary, the clientele equilibrium view would attribute a decline in the supply of dividends (for
example) to a decline in clientele demand, and further would predict that a nontrivial dividend
premium never emerges.
E. Catering
The catering theory of Baker and Wurgler (2002) offers a second demand-based
explanation for dividends. The theory argues that in inefficient stock markets, investor demand
can at times create a significant gap between the stock prices of payers and (otherwise similar)
nonpayers. This demand may come either from the rational clienteles enumerated above, or from
investor sentiment for dividends versus capital gains. In the catering theory, managers rationally
cater to this demand, paying dividends when dividend-paying shares are at a premium and not
paying when dividend payers are discounted.6 Empirically, this theory would attribute a
disappearance of dividends to a sustained stock market discount on dividend payers.
F. Slow learning about taxes
Our last hypothesis is that managers have been slow to learn the tax disadvantage of
paying cash dividends. As their awareness has grown, they have reduced their propensity to pay
dividends, presumably in favor of more lightly taxed repurchases, retained earnings, or cash-
financed acquisitions. In this spirit, Grinblatt and Titman (1998, p. 530) suggest that managers
have been “simply wrong” to have paid tax-disadvantaged dividends instead of repurchase for so
                                                
5 Del Guercio (1996) and Brav and Heaton (1998) study institutional investor clienteles induced by prudent man
rules. Lewellen, Stanley, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1978) and Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Trezevant (1999) document
tax clienteles. Lewellen et al. also find evidence of transaction cost clienteles among individual shareholders.
6 Note that when demand for dividends comes from rational clienteles, the catering theory is simply a disequilibrium
or inefficient markets version of the clientele equilibrium theory.
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long. Bagwell and Shoven (1989) propose that slow learning about the IRS treatment of
repurchases may explain why they did not emerge earlier.
III. News accounts of non-characteristics influences on dividends
With these candidate explanations in mind, our first style of analysis is a review of
historical New York Times articles that contain some discussion of dividends, whether in the
context of a single firm or more generally. Given our focus on the propensity to pay, we are
specifically interested in articles that make reference to some non-characteristics influence on
dividends, as opposed to firm or economic fundamentals that by definition cannot be driving the
trends that interest us.
This type of analysis is unconventional, but it serves a number of useful purposes. Most
important, it allows us to catalog the major institutional changes that a sophisticated set of
market observers connected to dividends. This helps us to determine whether the candidate
explanations in Table 1 can be viewed as comprehensive. Along the way, it also provides an
initial sort of reality check for the candidate explanations, by revealing which of them are and are
not cited by financial writers. Finally, by keeping track of the dates at which references are
clustered, we can get a sense of whether different forces were viewed as important at different
times, or whether a single force was seen to be driving multiple trends.
A. News sample
We use the database search engine Factiva to identify all New York Times articles
published between January 1, 1969 (when Factiva coverage begins) and December 31, 2001 that
11
contain “dividend” or “dividends” at least twice in the abstract.7 This leads to an initial sample of
1,567 unique articles to inspect more closely. We read the abstract of each of these articles to
determine whether it may contain some discussion of an influence on dividends that goes beyond
firm characteristics. Most articles do not. For example, connecting dividend policy to
profitability, “Wurlitzer Co. directors announce that dividend customarily paid … will be
omitted because of unprofitable operation results” (1/26/1974); or to investment opportunities,
“Ford Motor Co., citing slump in auto industry, says it will not pay dividend … says it must
conserve cash resources so it can continue development and introduction of new products”
(1/15/1982). Ultimately, 103 of the initial 1,567 abstracts suggest that the article may contain
some useful analysis or commentary. The elimination of 1,464 abstracts is described in more
detail in Appendix 2. For each of the 103 articles in the final sample, we read the full text from
the New York Times archives.
B. Classifying references
The 103 articles in our final sample turn out to contain 95 specific references to a non-
characteristics based mechanism that, according to one of our theories or through a separate
channel, might have affected dividends. (A few articles contain more than one such reference,
while others turn out to contain none, despite what is suggested in their abstract.) Although our
initial search criterion required “dividend” to appear at least twice in the abstract, only 44 of
these 95 references explicitly link dividend policy to the proposed mechanism. The 95 references
are listed in Table A and summarized in Table 2. We classify each reference according to which
explanation for changing propensity to pay that it most closely invokes.
                                                
7 The search engine for historical Wall Street Journal articles was not sufficiently precise. For example, one cannot
exclude advertisements. This causes thousands of false “hits” and makes the analysis unmanageable. In any case, it
seems reasonable to assume that any truly significant influence on dividends would be noted in the Times.
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Some examples will illustrate the classification process. The following quotation makes
reference to investor sentiment for dividends, a mechanism unique to the catering theory, but it
does not link through to dividend policy: “At the moment, the investment community seems to
be more desirous of receiving returns in the form of dividends rather than trying for capital
appreciation” (3/16/1975). For our purpose, the most illuminating references make an explicit
connection to dividend policy. The theory that dividend supply responds to tax clienteles is
suggested in the following: “The Senate Finance Committee bill … would reduce the effective
tax rate on dividends [from 50 to 27 percent], while raising the rate on capital gains [from 20 to
27 percent]. … Pressure will rise on corporations to increase dividend payouts …” (6/1/1986). A
column inspired by the working paper version of Fama and French (2001) cites stock options:
“One explanation [for the decline in percent of payers in the S&P] is … stock options …
arguably providing an incentive to companies not to pay dividends” (1/4/2000). The same article
also makes reference to catering to sentiment for dividends: “The most likely explanation [for
decline in percent of payers in S&P] … would seem to be the most obvious. Investors, after
seeing year after year of huge capital gains, no longer see much of a need for dividends as an
assured return if the market declines …” (1/4/2000).
Not surprisingly, some references are not specific enough to be unambiguously grouped
into a single theory. References to taxes are particularly difficult, because they could relate to
mechanisms in our clientele equilibrium hypothesis, our catering hypothesis, and our slow
learners hypothesis. For purposes of Table A and Table 2, our default is to group tax references
into clientele equilibrium unless there is reason to do otherwise. This should be kept in mind
when reviewing the tables.
C. Lessons from news analysis
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For the patient reader, a read through Table A offers a fascinating account of the (non-
characteristics) influences on dividends that were viewed as important by the financial press. It
provides rich historical context for the quantitative analysis in the next section. As summarized
in Table 2, it offers several initial lessons.
One lesson is that references to agency and asymmetric information are rare. Indeed it is
difficult to find even oblique references to these hypotheses. Of course, there would have been
many allusions to inside information or self-dealing if we had not required the abstract to contain
the word “dividend” at least twice. Any reference to hostile takeovers, expropriation by insiders,
or non-value-maximizing investment policy, for example, could be viewed as a reference to
agency, and would have been classified as such in our analysis. Our results do not indicate that
such forces are not recognized in the financial press; just that they do not appear in articles
selected to contain a discussion of dividends. In general, this fits with the CFO survey results of
Graham and Harvey (2001). They find that CFOs rarely attribute their financial policy decisions
to concerns about free cash flow or asymmetric information. 8
References to transaction costs, institutional investment constraints, and executive stock
options are also rare. We are unable to find any reference even to the general notion that
investors finance consumption with stock sales when dividends are insufficient, let alone a
discussion of how transaction costs affect homemade dividends strategies or the demand for
dividends. The timing of the references to institutional constraints and stock options, if not their
number, is noteworthy. One reference alludes to the 1974 ERISA limitations on pension fund
                                                
8 As Graham and Harvey note, it is possible that such influences are impounded into prices or credit ratings and
managers react to them indirectly. In our context, however, this argument would boil down to the assertion that the
underlying causes of sharp changes in the propensity to pay dividends, changes that affected hundreds or thousands
of the economy’s largest firms, had completely escaped the attention of the New York Times for over three decades.
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investments. Two references connecting stock options to dividend policy have appeared since
1999, but none before that.
Tax and catering references are the most frequent. Tax references are scattered
throughout the sample. Those that appear around the crucial 1977 turning point include a
proposal to eliminate double taxation of dividends, and a proposal to withhold taxes on dividend
income. Tax integration would have reduced the tax disadvantage of dividends, while
withholding would have increased it for tax cheats. Both proposals were defeated within a few
years, however, and thus could not explain the continuing downward trend in dividend payment.
The timing of the big clusters of catering references, on the other hand, are roughly consistent
with patterns in the propensity to pay. The bulk of the references to positive sentiment for
dividends appear in the years leading up to 1977, as the propensity to pay was rising to its peak.
Most of the negative sentiment references occur in the last few years of the sample, when the
propensity to pay was low and falling.
A final lesson from Table 2 is that our list of candidate explanations appears to be
sufficiently comprehensive, in the sense that we do not see references to any pervasive force that
would suggest a specific addition to this list. There are isolated episodes such as Nixon’s
encouragement to limit dividend growth to four percent per year in the early 1970’s – but Figure
1 shows that the propensity to pay had been declining for several years prior. The Nixon controls
could be an influence in this specific era, but do not represent a pervasive force. Similarly, there
are several references in the mid-1970’s to the notion of dividends as a “hedge against inflation,”
a notion dissected by Modigliani and Cohn (1979). These references seem most appropriately
viewed in connection with the sentiment references that appear at the same time, however, and
again not as a distinct and pervasive force.
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This analysis gives us some initial clues about the relative plausibility of our candidate
explanations. The tally in Table 2 tells us which forces were noticed by the financial press, and
thus (arguably) more salient to those who set dividend policy, and which forces must have been
working in the background if at all. It also tells us that catering and tax-based explanations are
among the stronger contenders for explaining multiple trends in the propensity to pay, as
opposed to isolated segments, since they are cited throughout the sample period. Of course, this
entire analysis, while quite useful for several purposes, comes with substantial caveats. For
example, one expects a bias toward reporting the sensational, such as colorful political fights
over tax policy. In the next section, we complement the impressions from the Times with a more
formal statistical analysis.
IV. Time series analysis of the propensity to pay
By definition, the propensity to pay must be driven by some time series influence. In our
second analysis we attempt to explicitly connect the propensity to pay to a set of empirical
proxies for non-characteristics influences on dividends. The basic idea is to see whether these
proxies line up, visually or in regressions, with the trends in Figure 1. As explained below, the
regressions also reveal the extent to which we can “solve” the disappearing dividends puzzle as it
is posed by Fama and French (2001).
A. Proxy variables
Good proxies do not exist for all of our candidate explanations. In particular, we are not
aware of plausible time-series measures of agency costs, investment constraint-driven dividend
clienteles, or the degree of “learning” about tax effects of dividends. Table 3 shows the data that
we have been able to assemble, which includes proxies for asymmetric information, tax
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clienteles, transaction cost clienteles, catering incentives, and executive stock options. For
reference, the table also lists the two propensity to pay series. We briefly describe each of these
measures below. More details are in Appendix 1.
Asymmetric information is inherently difficult to measure. Our approach is to proxy for it
using the average bid-ask spread reported by Jones (2002). To the extent that other components
of the spread, such as inventory and order-processing costs, are roughly stable over time, models
such as Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Easley and O’Hara (1987)
suggest that the observed spread is increasing in the asymmetry of information across market
participants. Consistent with this interpretation, Barclay and Smith (1988) find that spreads tend
to widen around open-market repurchase announcements.
Our proxies for the prevalence of tax-based clienteles are measures of the net tax
advantage of dividends for individuals and for corporations. The variable we focus on is the ratio
of the after-tax value of a dollar in dividends to the after-tax value of a dollar in long-term capital
gains. Poterba (1987) and Bernheim and Wantz (1995) consider similar measures. As described
in Appendix 1, the individual tax rates are weighted averages across groups of shareholders at
different marginal rates.
We proxy for the size of transaction cost-based clienteles using two proxies for the cost
of making homemade dividends. The first is based on data in Jones (2002). He reports average
fixed trading commissions on Dow Jones stocks and average bid-ask spreads for NYSE stocks.
For us, the relevant measure is the total one-way cost, estimated as one-half the bid-ask spread
plus the average commission on NYSE stocks. As a second measure, we consider the share of
total stock market capitalization held through mutual funds. Fama and French (2001, p. 40)
suggest that the cost of creating homemade dividends through transactions in a mutual fund
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account could be lower than the cost of buying and selling shares directly. If so, then the mutual
fund share should be inversely related to effective transaction costs.
Our measure of catering incentives is from Baker and Wurgler (2002). They construct a
stock market “dividend premium” variable as the difference between the average market-to-book
ratios of dividend payers and nonpayers (where the average is either equal- or book value-
weighted). They argue that when the dividend premium is positive, there exists a general stock
market incentive to pay dividends, and an incentive not to pay when it is negative. Note that this
measure of investor demand for dividend payers would reflect both rational clientele demands as
well any investor sentiment for payers.
The last concept we were able to find some reasonable proxies for is executive option
compensation. From the Hall and Liebman (1998) study of CEO compensation in several
hundred large companies, we take the mean value of options grants as a share of the mean total
of options grants, salary, and bonus. Conference Board surveys of top executive compensation
provide a second measure, longer but noisier than the Hall and Liebman variable. It is the
percentage of the large public corporations in the survey that report having an executive option
plan (of any size) in place.
B. Plots
Recall that we need to explain four distinct trends in the propensity to pay that appear in
Figure 1: (i) an increase from 1963 through 1966-68, depending on how one measures PTP; (ii) a
decrease from 1967-69 through 1972-74; (iii) an increase from 1973-75 through 1977; and (iv) a
decrease from 1978 through 2000. We can get an initial assessment of which of these proxy
variables could be relevant to these trends just by plotting them. Figure 2 shows these plots.
18
Looking first at the 1963 through 1966-68 period, the figure suggests that the dividend
premium is the only variable that would have predicted the consistent increase in the propensity
to pay. The dividend premium is positive through 1966, possibly representing a catering
incentive for dividend payment. The tax clientele proxies are moving in the right direction over
this period, with taxes becoming increasingly favorable to dividends, but the magnitude of these
changes seems too small to explain a robust supply response. The options plans variable
increases through 1969, thus predicting a decline in the propensity to pay rather than an increase.
The other proxies display no significant trends.
None of the variables clearly explains the second trend, the declining propensity to pay
through the early 1970’s. The tax advantage continues to increase over these years, the wrong
direction to explain a decline in dividends. The dividend premium does go substantially negative
for a few years, consistent with the declining propensity to pay, but it rebounds a bit too early for
a clear catering interpretation. The equal-weighted version of this variable, in Table 3 but not
plotted, does somewhat better; it falls lower than the value-weighted version, and remains low
for another year. The option plans variable shows an equally consistent pattern: It increases
through about 1970, consistent with the declining propensity to pay, but then it falls off.
However, note that Nixon was offering moral suasions against dividends from precisely late
1971 through early 1974. Given the Times articles about the effect of this policy, an appealing
explanation is that Nixon kept the propensity to pay in decline in the early 1970’s even though
catering and options measures began to point the other way.
Regarding the third trend, the sharply increasing propensity to pay in the mid-1970’s, the
plots are consistent with a role for catering and stock options. The positive dividend premium
that appears in this period is consistent with the Times references to positive sentiment for
19
dividends discussed earlier. The percentage of firms that report having executive options plans
also falls by several points over this period, contrary to conventional wisdom that the use of
stock options has grown monotonically for the past few decades, possibly increasing the
willingness to pay dividends.
The plots uncover several forces consistent with the fourth trend, the striking decline in
the propensity to pay that begins in 1978. A decline in the cost of making homemade dividends
is suggested in the Jones (2002) one-way costs variable, the growth of mutual funds, and the
emergence of dividend reinvestment plans. The bid-ask spread also displays a general decline
since the late 1970’s, perhaps indicating a reduced need to signal with dividends. Both stock
options proxies show a significant increase in the use of options, again consistent with a reduced
propensity to pay. On the other hand, proxies for tax clienteles clearly do not line up with this
trend. The tax preference for dividends has, if anything, increased significantly since the mid-
1970’s.
While our transaction costs, options, and asymmetric information proxies have been
moving in a direction that is generally consistent with the most recent disappearance of
dividends, only the dividend premium variable seems to address why the downturn started in
1978, as opposed to several years earlier or later. It turns negative in 1978 and remains there
through 2000 (except for a blip in 1998), thus predicting a sustained disappearance under the
logic of the catering theory. The wide discount in 1999 in the value-weighted version, and the
deeper and more consistent discount in the equal-weighted version, seems consistent with the
Times references to negative sentiment for dividends in these years.
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C. Regressions to explain the propensity to pay
We turn to regressions to more formally estimate the determinants of the propensity to
pay. As a preliminary step, we need to settle on the theoretically appropriate specifications. The
majority of our candidate explanations propose an equilibrium relationship between the
propensity to pay and a non-characteristics influence on dividends. For example, the clientele
equilibrium view holds that the level of the propensity to pay is closely connected to the relative
size of dividend and non-dividend clienteles. The asymmetric information theory also
emphasizes equilibrium. The nature of the relationship between dividend payment and executive
options is less clear, but it has an equilibrium flavor. Thus, for these theories, the natural
specification is simply
ttt ubXaPTP ++= , (1)
where PTP is the propensity to pay and X is a proxy for clienteles, asymmetric information, or
stock options.
Time series regressions of this form have an econometric problem. As shown by Granger
and Newbold (1974), they give misleading inferences when the variables are not stationary. 9 To
examine whether this is a concern in our data, Table 4 reports the results of Dickey-Fuller tests
for unit roots, as well as autocorrelations and cross-correlations. The unit root tests confirm the
potential for spurious regressions: they fail to reject a unit root in any of the variables. However,
after differencing, a unit root is always rejected. This suggests that in cases for which the model
in Eq. (1) is theoretically appropriate, we should also estimate the parallel form
                                                
9 There are theoretical reasons to expect several of our variables to be stationary in the large-sample sense. For
instance, the mutual fund share, the options proxies, the propensity to pay, and changes in the propensity to pay are
bounded by construction. (We obtain similar regression results if we apply a logistic transformation to the actual and
expected rates of payment.) Economic considerations suggest that the tax advantage variables and the dividend
premium also cannot grow without bound.
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ttt vXbaPTP +D+=D , (2)
where the deltas denote differences, and perhaps give more weight to these inferences.
The catering theory involves dynamics in disequilibrium, and thus suggests a different
regression specification. The theory proposes that uninformed investor demand for dividend
payers fluctuates faster than firms can adjust. A nontrivial dividend premium (or discount)
appears, and firms cater to the implied excess demand. The appropriate specification for
evaluating this dynamic is to regress changes in the propensity to pay on the beginning-of-period
level of the dividend premium
ttt wbXaPTP ++=D -1 , (3)
where X is the dividend premium. Fortunately, we can nearly reject a unit root in the level of the
dividend premium, with p-values at 0.10 for the equal-weighted series and 0.16 for the value-
weighted series (Table 4), and there are also strong prior theoretical reasons to believe that it is
stationary. As a result, we do not make further adjustments to this specification.
Table 5 reports the regression results. The levels-on-levels regressions and the
differences-on-differences regressions generally do not find strong support for any of our
equilibrium-based theories. The tax variables consistently take the wrong sign. The transaction
cost proxies flip sign between the full sample and the early subsample. Options variables, by
contrast, do slightly better. The levels specification for the options share of CEO compensation
works through a common trend, as the relationship disappears in differences. On the other hand,
the options specifications are not as tightly motivated by theory as the clientele equilibrium
specifications, for instance, and we are working with only 15 observations on the options share
variable, so these mitigating factors should be kept in mind.
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Turning to the changes on levels specifications, the most noteworthy result is the
comparatively robust effect of the dividend premium. It has the sign hypothesized by the catering
theory, and keeps the same magnitude across sample periods and whether or not the market-to-
book ratio is included in the logits used to estimate the propensity to pay. This might have been
anticipated from the earlier plots.
We also report changes-on-lagged-levels specifications for the clientele demand proxies,
because in principle they could shed light on the source of investor demand behind the dividend
premium effect. If firms are catering to clientele demand, for example, then we might also hope
to find that one or more of the clientele proxies themselves affect changes in the propensity to
pay when the dividend premium is excluded (in the logic of the theory, the dividend premium is
a summary statistic for excess clientele demand). If firms are catering to sentiment for dividends,
on the other hand, then there is no particular reason to expect that clientele proxies would enter
in these specifications. However, Table 5 shows that none of our clientele proxies has a robust
effect in these specifications. Without evidence for any particular clientele behind the dividend
premium, process of elimination suggests a role for investor sentiment.
To summarize, our regression analysis tends to reinforce support for one of the candidate
explanations that also performed well in the news analysis, catering to time-varying sentiment
for dividend payers, and casts serious doubt on another, tax clientele equilibrium. The options
explanation receives an intermediate degree of support. Agency, slow learning, and investment
constraints-based explanations get an incomplete; we lack the data to evaluate them.
D. Out-of-sample forecast
Fama and French (2001) emphasize the most recent decline in the propensity to pay.
Given the prominence of this result, an important question is whether any of our proxies could
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“explain” it as an empirical matter. To give a precise answer to this question, one needs to stay
faithful to their empirical framework. To review, they use the 1963-1977 Compustat data to fit a
model of the expected percentage of payers, and then they evaluate this model at the sample
characteristics that prevail from 1978 and forward to make a true out-of-sample forecast of the
expected percentage in each year. The difference between the actual and the expected percentage
is the propensity to pay, which by 2000 has reached -30 percent. The details of their procedure
are given in Appendix 1.
This procedure suggests a natural way to determine whether a given time-series variable
is capable of accounting for this decline. Start by taking the propensity to pay variable as data.
Then fit a regression model between the propensity to pay and the candidate variable over the
1963-1977 series, and use the fitted model to forecast the expected propensity to pay from 1978
forward. If the actual decline in the propensity to pay lines up with this forecast, then as an
empirical matter the disappearance of dividends, as it is posed by Fama and French (2001), has
been “explained.”
Intuitively, to be successful in this exercise, a candidate variable must have a stable
relationship with the propensity to pay. If it does not, then the out-of-sample forecast error will
blow up. The other key requirement is a good fit. If the model has little explanatory power then
its forecasts will be inaccurate, even if they are not systematically biased. These considerations
suggest that we consider the option plans and the dividend premium variables as candidates in
this exercise, since in Table 5 they are the variables that obtain roughly similar coefficients (of
the right sign) in both the 1963-1977 subperiod and the full sample, and high t-statistics at least
in some specifications. (In univariate regressions estimated in the same sample and with the
same dependent variable, ranking t-statistics is the same as ranking the R2.)
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Table 6 shows the out-of-sample forecasts using the option plans variable. It appears
incapable of explaining the magnitude of the post-1978 decline – its forecast for the expected
propensity to pay is too little, too late. The pathology of this failure can be understood by looking
at the forecasting model itself, and the basic pattern of option plans variable. That is, comparing
the early sample and full sample coefficients in Panel B, one can see that the coefficient in the
in-sample model is smaller than it wants to be to explain PTP out of sample. In addition, the
option plans variable doesn’t begin its increase until 1994. By then, virtually all of the
“disappearance” has already occurred.10
In contrast, Table 7 shows that the dividend premium variable is better able to account for
the magnitude of the disappearance.11 The forecast error when market-to-book is included is
always less than 10 percentage points (and usually positive), and less than 6 percentage points
(and usually negative) when it is excluded. Given that the propensity to pay is itself surely
measured with at least a few percentage points of error, this is probably about as good as one
could hope to achieve.
V. Other time-series patterns involving dividend policy
Our main goal is to determine the cause of fluctuations in the propensity to pay
dividends. However, another angle from which to evaluate our candidate explanations for those
trends is to examine the extent to which the same explanations are consistent with related trends
in the data. Of particular interest are other time-series patterns that, like the propensity to pay
                                                
10 The Hall and Liebman sample is not long enough to use in this exercise. However, they report that the median
options grant is $0 until 1985. Again, by this year half of the disappearance has already taken place.
11 Since the dividend premium-based forecasts are generated from the changes on levels regressions in Table 5, we
forecast changes in the propensity to pay, starting in 1978, and then cumulate them to estimate the expected
propensity to pay from year to year.
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dividends, cannot be clearly attributed to firm characteristics, and hence are more likely to be
“out of sample” reflections of the same underlying economic forces.
We are aware of two such patterns, both suggested by recent research.12 The first is that
the propensity to repurchase shares has increased in recent years. The second is that changes in
the propensity to pay dividends help to predict the relative stock returns of payers and nonpayers.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct thorough analyses of these two facts, both of
which are very interesting in their own right. Here we limit ourselves to a brief discussion of the
extent to which they are, in principle, consistent or inconsistent with our candidate explanations
for fluctuations in the propensity to pay dividends.
A. Dividends disappearing, repurchases appearing
Share repurchases increased dramatically in the mid-1980’s, a trend identified by
Bagwell and Shoven (1989). Grullon and Michaely (2002) document growth in repurchases
whether measured as a raw level, as a share of total payouts, or as a percentage of firms that use
them. Their results come close to establishing that the propensity to repurchase, in the Fama and
French (2001) sense of controlling for characteristics, has been increasing in recent decades,
even as the propensity to pay dividends has been decreasing.13 This points to a clear screen for
our candidate explanations: They must distinguish between dividends and repurchases in order to
explain a secular trend away from one and toward the other.
                                                
12 DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2002) document a number of interesting trends in dividend payment. We do
not cover them here because, as the authors show, they reflect changes in firm characteristics. For instance,
DeAngelo et al. document that continuing payers have increased dividends in concert with their earnings. They also
show that the majority of the disappearance of small-dividend payers comes about via acquisition or financial
distress, circumstances likely to be closely connected to characteristics. Although we do not consider their results in
detail, it is worth noting that DeAngelo et al. conclude that their results do not support asymmetric information or
clientele equilibrium theories. From a different set of empirical patterns, we reach the same conclusion.
13 Fama and French observe that an increasing propensity to repurchase cannot completely account for the declining
propensity to pay dividends, since repurchases are concentrated among current dividend payers.
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Most of our candidate explanations survive this screen. The most obvious survivors are
those based on some tax mechanism, since taxes immediately draw a sharp distinction between
dividends and repurchases. These include slow learning about taxes, tax-based asymmetric
information models, and tax-clientele versions of clientele equilibrium and catering. Dividends
are also distinct from repurchases under the stock options hypothesis and a catering-to-sentiment
hypothesis. The comparative stability of dividends makes them better for financing consumption,
so theories involving transaction-cost clienteles also seem capable of a distinction. Finally,
certain investment constraints, such as spending from income but not capital, or dividend
payment as a proxy characteristic of a prudent investment, make dividends and repurchases
imperfect substitutes for some investors.
This screen does turn out to have some bite, however. One prominent theory that
inherently fails to separate dividends and repurchases is the investment-based asymmetric
information model, such as Miller and Rock (1985). The problem is that dividends and
repurchases enter the sources-uses constraint in the same way. In addition, the agency view of
payouts also does not inherently distinguish between dividends and repurchases. According to
Easterbrook (1984, p. 655), they are equally good at tying managers to the discipline of the
capital markets. According to Jensen (1986), they are equally dominated by debt.
B. Changes in propensity to pay predicts stock returns
Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that the aggregate rate of dividend initiation and omission
are strong predictors of the relative stock returns of payers and nonpayers. When initiations are
common, returns on payers are relatively low over the next one to three years. When omissions
are common, the opposite holds. Since changes in the percentage of dividend payers depend
mechanically on initiations and omissions, these results immediately suggest that changes in the
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propensity to pay may also predict relative returns.14 This is worth checking because any novel
relationship that directly involves the propensity to pay could give useful leverage to
discriminate among alternative explanations.
Table 8 generally confirms the expected pattern. In the top panel, the dependent variable
is the difference between the returns on value-weighted indexes of payers and nonpayers, and the
independent variable is the (standardized) change in the propensity to pay. The other panels
regress payer and nonpayer returns separately to see whether the relative return predictability can
be attributed solely to one of these components. The table reports ordinary least-squares
coefficients and coefficients adjusted for the small-sample bias analyzed by Stambaugh (1999).
The p-values in the table represent a two-tailed test of the hypothesis of no predictability using
the bootstrap described in Baker and Wurgler (2002). OLS p-values would indicate uniformly
higher levels of significance (unreported).
The results in Table 8 echo the predictability associated with initiation and omission in
Baker and Wurgler (2002), though they are not quite as strong as the results there. One clear
pattern is the difference between the results that include and exclude the market-to-book ratio
from the PTP measure: Those that include it are at best marginally significant, while those that
exclude it are very strong. Figure 1 provides a compelling explanation for this difference. Panels
C and D of that figure indicate that the inclusion of market-to-book essentially just adds high-
frequency noise to the four low-frequency trends in PTP. The fact that evidence of predictability
gets stronger when measurement error is reduced tends to bolster our confidence that the
predictability pattern is genuine.
                                                
14 The mechanical connection is not exact, because the change in the percentage of payers is also affected by new
lists and delists. Further, characteristics are taken out when defining the propensity to pay.
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The pattern of predictability seems most consistent with catering. The catering theory
proposes that firms tend to pay dividends when dividend payers are relatively highly priced. This
logic predicts that increases in the propensity to pay will, as arbitrage slowly corrects the relative
mispricing, forecast decreases in the relative return on payers. The results in Panel A would be
consistent with this dynamic working at horizons of roughly a few years. It is hard to articulate
how other candidate explanations would imply this predictive relationship (or the closely related
results involving initiations and omissions).
VI. Summary
In this paper, we evaluate explanations for the major time trends in the propensity to pay
dividends documented by Fama and French (2001). We employ three very different types of
analysis in an effort to be as comprehensive as practically possible: a review of historical New
York Times articles that involve dividends; a formal analysis of time series relationships between
the propensity to pay and proxy variables for driving influences; and a discussion of the capacity
of our candidate explanations to incorporate related patterns in the data.
A. A scorecard
Table 9 summarizes our findings into a rough scorecard. The first column indicates which
candidate explanations receive a nontrivial number of references (more than two) within our 32-
year sample of New York Times articles that involve dividends. Media attention centers on three
explanations: clientele equilibrium theories emphasizing taxes, catering (usually to investor
sentiment, not to rational dividend clienteles), and slow learning about taxes.
The next columns report the ability of our candidate explanations, as embodied by time
series proxy variables, to explain the four distinct trends in the propensity to pay dividends that
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occur between 1963 and 2000. Not surprisingly, we found that it is usually possible to line up a
given proxy variable with at least one trend. The dividend premium variable, our proxy for
catering incentives, lines up with all four, strong evidence that it is capturing a pervasive and
genuine effect. It tends to be positive when the propensity to pay is increasing, and negative
when it is decreasing, consistent with catering. Unfortunately, our proxies do not cover all of the
candidate explanations, so some entries are left blank. The slow learning about taxes view is an
exception. Since this theory predicts a gradual decline in the propensity to pay, we know that
even without a proxy for “learning,” this view could not explain the upturns in the propensity to
pay in the mid-1960’s and mid-1970’s.
The sixth column reports the ability of our proxy variables to “explain” the post-1978
disappearance in the specific empirical sense of Fama and French (2001). The dividend premium
variable can account for the magnitude of the decline in the out-of-sample forecasting exercise
that their methodology suggests. Our other proxies are less successful, because they do not bear a
sufficiently strong and robust relationship to the propensity to pay.
The last columns show which of our candidates are, in theory, consistent with two
additional time-series patterns that involve dividends and that cannot be directly attributed to
firm characteristics. The table indicates that several explanations are compatible with the fact
that the propensity to repurchase has increased even as the propensity to pay dividends has
declined. In contrast, only catering appears to offer a natural explanation for why changes in the
propensity to pay would be inversely related to the future excess stock returns of payers over
nonpayers.
Table 9 also illustrates the strength and the weakness of our approach. The strength is the
breadth of the analysis, in terms of the number of hypotheses and the range of phenomena that
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we attempt to address. The payoff to this is clear from a look down the fifth column, “Down
1978-2000.” Had we limited our scope to just this single trend, the one emphasized by Fama and
French, we would have had little power to reject any hypotheses. It is always possible to match
up a single time trend with another time trend. More progress is possible if one applies a
consistent theoretical perspective to all aspects of the data, and considers the evidence as a
whole. This approach leads to a clear conclusion: If one is looking for a single explanation for
fluctuations in the propensity to pay dividends between 1963 and 2000, catering is the best
candidate.
The weakness of our approach is that data do not exist to evaluate all hypotheses on all
dimensions. Invariably we are forced to leave some blank cells in the scorecard. However, as it
stands, the scorecard suggests that more data is unlikely to change the basic conclusion: None of
the explanations for which we lack a very good proxy variable – agency, stock options,
investment constraints-based clientele theories, and learning about taxes – receive robust support
from the analyses that are available. As the table indicates, even if one gave these theories the
full benefit of the doubt and replaced each blank in the table with an “X,” each of them would
still fail to address multiple aspects of the data.
B. A stylized account of the propensity to pay dividends, 1963-2000
We conclude the paper by offering a stylized account of the propensity to pay dividends
between 1963 and 2000. This would not be necessary if the propensity to pay was related to a
variable with a simple interpretation, like taxes. As it stands, the propensity to pay depends on
the dividend premium, so it is incumbent on us to attempt at least a preliminary description of the
evolution of this apparently crucial variable. And given that we were unable to attribute the
dividend premium’s effect to any of several proxies for dividend clienteles, as well as the
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frequent references to catering to sentiment (as opposed to clienteles) in the Times, our task boils
down to describing the evolution of sentiment for dividends. This is still not a simple task. To
our knowledge, the only semi-rigorous way to construct a timeline of sentiment is to identify
common themes from academic histories of the capital market and discussions in the media. We
take this approach below. We also attempt to integrate into the narrative certain other influences
that the evidence suggests may have played some role.
We begin in 1963. The very high dividend premium in this year seems to be fallout from
the 1962 crash in small growth stocks. As Malkiel (1990, p. 54 - 57) describes it, “The new-issue
mania rivaled the South Sea Bubble in its intensity and also, regrettably, in the fraudulent
practices that were revealed. … The tronics boom came back to earth in 1962. … Growth stocks
… took the brunt of the decline, falling much further than the general market. Yesterday’s hot
issue became today’s cold turkey.” By 1963, the relatively greater fall of small growth stocks,
typically nonpayers, was manifest in a high dividend premium.15 In a pattern that repeats in later
years, investors appear to have reacted to the crash by turning toward the “safer” returns on
income-producing stocks, and firms catered by increasing their propensity to pay.
According to Malkiel and the Times, the late 1960’s saw the return of a speculative
market and with it a shift in demand toward nonpayers. The Times writes, “During the
speculative market of the late 1960’s many brokers told customers that it didn’t matter whether a
company paid a dividend – just so long as its stock kept going up” (9/13/1976).16 The bull
                                                
15 Consistent with this dynamic, Fuller and Goldstein (2002) find that payers have higher (less negative) returns than
nonpayers in months in which the S&P Index return is negative. This pattern also holds after controlling for various
factor loadings.
16 An interesting note is that bond returns are also poor in this period. Homer and Sylla (1996, p. 380) argue that
“people began to think that the bond market was a thing of the past.” One possibility is that since dividend payers
and bonds both share a highly salient “income” characteristic, investors were withdrawing from both categories in
favor of securities that offered full potential for capital gains. A clearer link between bonds and dividend payers
occurs in the late-1970’s, as described below.
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market ended in 1970, and the dividend premium was again positive by 1971. But at this point,
Nixon had begun his exhortations against increasing dividends, which Times accounts suggest
were having some effect (see also Baker and Wurgler (2002)). This odd intervention seems
likely to explain why the propensity to pay kept declining for a few more years, even though the
positive dividend premium indicated the return of a demand for payers.
The mid-1970’s witnessed a high dividend premium and an increasing propensity to pay
dividends. According to the New York Times, the 1973 and 1974 bear market appears to have
engendered another return to the perceived safety of dividend payers and sustained an already
high dividend premium: “Thanks to … [characteristics and] the rising yield-consciousness of
stockholders, corporations are fattening their dividend payouts. … As investors became chary of
the stock market, they were less apt to count on future earnings growth … and more likely to
return to the bird-in-the-hand rationale of cash dividends.” (11/7/1976). Thus part of the increase
in the propensity to pay seems to reflect catering, and another part may be due to the lifting of
Nixon’s controls.
The most interesting episode is the late 1970’s. As noted earlier, the dividend premium
drops sharply, is negative by 1978, and deeply negative by 1979. And the propensity to pay
dividends begins its long decline. What happened? Historical accounts suggest that the distaste
for dividend payers was closely connected to an emerging distaste for the other prominent
income-producing security, bonds, which had been punished for several years by high inflation.
Homer and Sylla (1996, p. 381-386) describe the fiscal circumstances contributing to high yields,
and Malkiel (1990) details the declining sentiment for bonds.17 Investors appear to have
simultaneously withdrawn from two major categories, bonds and dividend-paying stocks. Thus
                                                
17 Malkiel relates a joke which appeared in 1981: “’A bond is a fixed-rate instrument designed to fall in price.’”
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references to positive sentiment for dividends, frequent in the Times in the years leading up to
1978, suddenly disappear, as do references to a preference for “income” or “yield” or to the
belief that dividends provide a hedge against inflation. Modigliani and Cohn (1979) capture the
shift in sentiment: “Until their poor performance in recent years, equities had traditionally been
regarded as an ideal hedge against inflation” (p. 24).
Our time series proxies suggest that other trends, such as declining transaction costs, may
also have depressed the demand for payers through the 1980’s and 1990’s. Easier to defend
influences are on the supply side, in particular the explosion in stock options and the 1982
introduction of Rule 10b-18, which Grullon and Michaely (2002) show to have paved the way
for repurchases. However, our rather extensive search turns up no evidence that any of these
factors initiated the post-1978 decline in the propensity to pay. Like previous sharp turning
points in the propensity to pay, this switch appears to have been initiated by a switch in investor
attitudes. Options, repurchases, and perhaps clienteles have propagated the decline, once already
underway. 18
Sentiment for nonpayers returned with the Internet, reinforcing if not overwhelming the
complementary trends in options, repurchases, and perhaps traditional clienteles. At the
beginning of 2000 the equal-weighted dividend premium was at its sample minimum of –74.90
percent, and the value-weighted variable had also reached its sample minimum of –33.17
percent. This episode is recent enough to be familiar to most readers; Richardson and Ofek
(2002) provide a detailed analysis. The Times summarizes the prevailing attitude: “Today’s
                                                
18 Of course, the dividend premium remains consistently negative from 1978 through 2000, so it is not strictly
necessary to appeal beyond catering incentives to explain the continued decline. Nevertheless, the results of Fenn
and Liang (2001) and Grullon and Michaely indicate that options and repurchases have played at least a supporting
role.
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investors, fixated on making a quick buck, are likely to wonder how anyone could ever have
been interested in something so obviously irrelevant as dividends” (8/6/2000).
C. Epilogue
As of this writing in late 2002, Internet stocks have officially crashed and most market
observers characterize the current situation as a bear market. After earlier crashes, investor
preferences shifted toward dividends, and there is anecdotal evidence that this is happening once
again. For example, the title of a 1/28/2002 article in the Times suggests that investors have been
finding, or at least seeking, “Solace In Stocks That Pay Dividends.” It will be interesting to see
whether dividends reappear in the next few years.
35
Appendix 1. Compustat data and time series variables
A.1. Compustat sample
The 1962-2000 Compustat sample is defined following Fama and French (2001, p. 40-
41): “The Compustat sample for calendar year t … includes those firms with fiscal year-ends in t
that have the following data (Compustat annual data items in parentheses): total assets (6), stock
price (199) and shares outstanding (25) at the end of the fiscal year, income before extraordinary
items (18), interest expense (15), [cash] dividends per share by ex date (26), preferred dividends
(19), and (a) preferred stock liquidating value (10), (b) preferred stock redemption value (56), or
(c) preferred stock carrying value (130). Firms must also have (a) stockholder’s equity (216), (b)
liabilities (181), or (c) common equity (60) and preferred stock par value (130). Total assets must
be available in years t and t-1. The other items must be available in t. … We exclude firms with
book equity below $250,000 or assets below $500,000. To ensure that firms are publicly traded,
the Compustat sample includes only firms with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11, and we use only
the fiscal years a firm is in the CRSP database at its fiscal year-end. … We exclude utilities (SIC
codes 4900-4949) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999).” The average number of firms in
the sample between 1963 and 1977 (1978 and 2000) is 1,776 (3,797).
A.2. Firm characteristics and dividend payment
Firm size, investment opportunities, profitability characteristics, and dividend payment
are defined following Fama and French (2001). NYP is the NYSE market capitalization
percentile, i.e. the fraction of firms on the NYSE having equal or smaller capitalization than firm
i in year t. M/B is the market-to-book ratio, defined as book assets minus book equity plus
market equity all divided by book assets. Market equity is fiscal year closing price times shares
outstanding (199 times 25). Book equity is stockholders’ equity (Item 216) [or first available of
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common equity (60) plus preferred stock par value (130) or book assets (6) minus liabilities
(181)] minus preferred stock liquidating value (10) [or first available of redemption value (56) or
par value (130)] plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (35) if available and
minus post retirement assets (330) if available. Growth in book assets dA/A is self-explanatory.
Profitability E/A is earnings before extraordinary items (18) plus interest expense (15) plus
income statement deferred taxes (50) divided by book assets. A firm-year observation is a
dividend payer if it has positive dividends per share by the ex date, else it is a nonpayer.
A.3. Propensity to pay dividends
The propensity to pay dividends is estimated following Fama and French (2001). Fama-
MacBeth logit regressions of the probability that a firm with given characteristics is a dividend
payer are estimated year by year, from 1963 to 1977, in the Compustat sample, and the
coefficients are averaged across years. Two logit models are fit in this manner. One includes the
characteristics NYP, M/B, dA/A, and E/A, and the other excludes M/B:
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The expected percentage of dividend payers in the Compustat sample in year t is then estimated
by applying Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) to the values of the explanatory variables for each firm,
summing over firms, dividing by the number of firms and multiplying by 100. The propensity to
pay dividends PTP in year t is defined as the difference between the actual and expected
percentage of payers.
A.4. One-way transaction costs and the bid-ask spread
Jones (2002) reports an annual time series of the average percent commission on round-
lot NYSE transactions and of the average percent bid-ask spread on Dow Jones Industrial
Average stocks. Total one-way trading costs in a given year are measured as one-half the average
bid-ask spread plus the average commission.
A.5. Mutual funds
The Federal Reserve Flow of Funds reports the aggregate net asset value of equity mutual
funds (Table L.122, row 10). They obtain their data from the Investment Company Institute. This
value is divided by the aggregate NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq market capitalization from CRSP to
measure the share of public equities held through mutual funds.
A.6. Tax advantage of dividends
The personal tax advantage for dividends (typically a net disadvantage) is measured as
the relative after-tax income from dividends versus long-term capital gains for individual
investors as calculated by the NBER TAXSIM model. The model computes average marginal
income and long-term capital gains rates as the weighted average rates across shareholder groups
(reported at www.nber.org/~taxsim/mrates/mrates2.html). See Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for a
description of the TAXSIM model. Specifically, the personal tax advantage is one minus the
average marginal income rate, divided by one minus the average marginal long-term capital
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gains rate, all minus one, and all multiplied by 100. The corporate tax advantage of dividends is
measured as the relative after-tax income from dividends versus long-term capital gains for C
corporations. That is, we take one minus the product of the top C corporation income rate and
one minus the intercorporate dividend exclusion, divided by one minus the capital gains rate, all
minus one, all multiplied by 100. 1970-2000 corporate rates are from Graham (2001), earlier are
from various issues of the IRS Statistics of Income: Corporation Income Tax Returns.
A.7. Dividend premium
The dividend premium variables are from Baker and Wurgler (2002). They compute the
average (equal and book-value weighted) market-to-book ratio for dividend payers, and the
average (equal and book-value weighted) for non-payers, for each year. The dividend premium is
then the difference between the logs of these averages. They measure the market-to-book ratio
using the calendar-year end stock price, rather than the fiscal-year end price, but otherwise
follow the market-to-book definition given above.
A.8. Executive stock options
Large company executive stock option grants are from Hall and Leibman’s (1997)
extension of the sample in Yermack (1995). For each year between 1980 and 1994, Hall and
Liebman report the mean value of CEO stock option grants and the mean value of CEO salary
and bonus for the 400 or so largest publicly traded firms (where size is defined by Forbes). The
prevalence of executive stock option plans is the percentage of firms reporting having some plan
in the Conference Board’s Top Executive Compensation surveys. The survey typically includes
about 1,000 large public corporations, and spans all industries. We compute the weighted
average prevalence of stock option plans in nonfinancial and nonutility industries to better match
the industry composition of our Compustat sample.
39
Appendix 2. New York Times references to non-characteristics influences on dividends
The sample of media references is gathered as follows. The database search engine
Factiva is used to identify all New York Times articles published between January 1, 1969 (the
first year of coverage in Factiva) and December 31, 2001 that contain “dividend” or “dividends”
at least twice in the abstract. This leads to an initial sample of 1,567 unique articles to inspect
more closely. The abstract of each article is read in order to categorize the article as a mistaken
reference (e.g., using the word “dividend” metaphorically such as “peace dividend”), a simple
straight news report of a dividend action, or as a potentially useful article. Specifically, 6 are
mistakes, 374 report an impending dividend decision, 133 report an omission, 126 report a
reduction, 393 report an increase, 51 report an initiation, and 145 report a dividend action but do
not distinguish its nature.
The remaining abstracts suggest that the article contains some analysis of a specific
dividend decision or a broader influence on dividends. 236 of these do not go beyond firm or
broad economic characteristics (which are implicitly captured by firm characteristics), and so are
irrelevant to the propensity to pay. The final sample of 103 abstracts includes all those that
suggest that the article may reference a non-characteristics influence on dividends. Hard copies
of these articles are gathered and read in full text. Table A lists the 95 references made in these
103 articles (some articles contain more than one relevant reference, while others turn out to
contain none, despite what is suggested by their abstract).
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Figure 1. Disappearing dividends: Changing characteristics and changing propensity to pay. Panels A and B
show the actual percent (solid) and expected percent (dash) of dividend payers in Compustat. Panels C and D show
the propensity to pay dividends, i.e. the difference between the actual and expected percent. Panels E and F show
changes in the propensity to pay dividends. Actual percent is the number of dividend payers divided by the number
of firms in the sample that year. Expected percent is the expected percent of dividend payers based on prevailing
sample characteristics. Following Fama and French (2001), and as described in Appendix 1, one set of results
(Panels A, C, and E) estimates the expected percent of payers with a logit model that includes the NYSE market
capitalization percentile, the market-to-book ratio, asset growth, and profitability. The other set (Panels B, D, and F)
excludes market-to-book. The propensity to pay dividends PTP is the difference between the actual and expected
percent. Detailed sample and variable definitions are in Appendix 1.
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Figure 2. Time series influences on dividends. Panel A shows total one-way trading costs calculated as one-half
the average percent bid-ask spread on Dow Jones Industrial Average stocks plus the average percent commission on
round-lot NYSE transactions, both from Jones (2002). Panel B shows the average percent bid-ask spread on its own.
Panel C shows the aggregate net asset value of equity mutual funds as a percent share of total NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq
market capitalization. Panels D and E show the personal and corporate tax advantage of dividends (the percent
difference in after-tax income received from dividends versus long-term capital gains) respectively. Panel F shows
the mean value of option grants as a percent of mean total CEO compensation (options grants plus salary and bonus)
from Hall and Liebman (1998). Panel G shows the percent of corporations (excluding financials and utilities) with
an executive stock option plan in place from annual Conference Board surveys. Panel H shows the value-weighted
dividend premium from Baker and Wurgler (2002) in percentage terms. Detailed variable definitions are in
Appendix 1.
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Table 1. Potential explanations for changes in the propensity to pay dividends. The table outlines explanations for time series fluctuations in the propensity
to pay dividends that are motivated by the literature. The right column uses a declining propensity to pay as an illustrative example.
Explanation Theoretical basis Mechanism behind declining propensity to pay
Agency Easterbrook (1984), Jensen
(1986), La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(2000)
Substitute corporate governance mechanisms have become relatively more effective,
reducing the need for dividends to control free cash flow problems.
Information asymmetry Ross (1977), Bhattacharya
(1979), John and Williams
(1985), Miller and Rock (1985)
Information asymmetries have disappeared or substitute signaling mechanisms have
become relatively more effective, reducing the need to signal inside information through
dividends.
Stock options Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker
(1989)
Managerial compensation in the form of stock options (without dividend protection) has
grown, leading to a bias against dividends.
Clientele equilibrium
Taxes
Investment constraints
Transaction costs
Miller and Modigliani (1961),
Black and Scholes (1974),
Miller (1977), Miller (1986),
Allen, Bernardo, and Welch
(2001)
Market imperfections that lead certain investors to rationally prefer dividends, such as
taxes, institutional investment constraints, or transaction costs, have changed over time so
as to shrink pro-dividend clienteles and thus dividends supplied in equilibrium.
Catering Baker and Wurgler (2002) Investor demand for nonpayers, driven by rational clientele considerations or sentiment,
has caused a stock market discount on payers and thus reduced the incentive to pay.
Slow learning about taxes None specific Managers have been persuaded of the tax disadvantage of dividends as governance
mechanisms have improved, or they are just slow learners.
Table 2. Summary of New York Times references to non-characteristics influences on dividends. Classification
of references to non-characteristics based influences on dividends (as opposed to earnings or investment
opportunities) that appear in the New York Times. Using Factiva, we identify 1,567 unique New York Times articles
published between January 1, 1969 and December 31, 2001 that contain “dividend” or “dividends” at least twice in
the abstract. From these 1,567 abstracts, we identify and read the full text of 103 articles that appear (on the basis of
their abstract) to provide an analysis of dividend policy that goes beyond firm characteristics. From these 103
articles, we confirm and record 95 specific references to potential non-characteristics influences on dividends. We
classify these references according to the explanation for changing propensity to pay dividends that they most
closely invoke. (All references to clientele demands are classified under clientele equilibrium.) The middle column
indicates the date around which references to each theme are concentrated. The second-to-last column shows the
total number of references to each explanation or associated mechanism, and the last column shows the number that
propose a link to dividend policy. Appendix 2 describes the article selection and reference classification procedure
in detail. Table A lists the references themselves.
Explanation Mechanism Date concentration
Total
references
Linked to
policy
Agency 1971 1 1
Information asymmetry . 0 0
Stock options 1999-2000 2 2
Clientele equilibrium
Taxes
Tax integration proposal 1975-78 8 0
Withholding tax proposal 1980-83 21 0
Personal tax changes 1981, 1986 6 5
Intercorporate tax changes 1995 1 1
Investment constraints 1977 2 1
Transaction costs . 0 0
Catering
Positive sentiment 1975-77, 1984 11 5
Negative sentiment 1966-68, 1995-2000 10 7
Slow learning about taxes 1995-2000 5 5
Other
Nixon dividend controls 1971-73 5 5
Inflation hedge 1974-77 5 1
DRIPs 1975-78 7 0
Repurchases 1995-2001 11 11
Total 95 44
Table 3.  The propensity to pay and proxies for non-characteristics influences on dividends. The propensity to pay dividends is the difference between the
actual and expected percentage of dividend payers. Following Fama and French (2001), the expected percentage of payers is estimated from logit regressions that
take into account a set of characteristics that alternately does or does not include the market-to-book ratio. Transaction costs include total one-way trading costs
(one-half the average percent bid-ask spread on Dow Jones Industrial Average stocks plus the average percent commission on round-lot NYSE transactions) and
the average percent bid-ask spread on Dow Jones stocks, both from Jones (2002). Mutual funds data includes the aggregate net asset value of U.S. equity mutual
funds (in current $ billions) and as a percent share of total NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq market capitalization. The personal and corporate tax advantage of dividends is
the after-tax income received from a dollar in dividends relative to a dollar in long-term capital gains. Options data includes the mean grant for CEOs in the
Forbes compensation survey (in 1994 $ thousands) and the mean grant as a share of the mean total option grants, salary, and bonus compensation for CEOs, both
from Hall and Liebman (1998). The prevalence of option plans is the percent of corporations (excluding financials and utilities) with an executive stock option
plan in place and taken from annual Conference Board surveys. The equal-weighted and value-weighted dividend premium are in percentage terms and taken
from Baker and Wurgler (2002). Detailed definitions are in Appendix 1.
(see next page)
Propensity to Pay Transaction Costs Mutual Funds Tax Advantage Options Dividend Premium
M/B No M/B
One-
way Spread NAV Share Personal Corp Grants Share Plans EW VW
1962 -1.89 -2.09 1.10 0.27 18.3 5.45 -29.00 17.20 74.33 22.86 34.89
1963 1.63 0.75 1.18 0.30 22.1 5.54 -28.00 17.20 73.88 19.40 32.92
1964 2.15 1.43 1.14 0.26 25.6 5.55 -27.00 17.20 73.90 20.06 35.64
1965 6.77 4.21 1.11 0.22 30.9 5.92 -27.00 17.80 73.93 8.79 22.65
1966 5.00 4.36 1.10 0.27 28.9 6.18 -28.00 17.80 76.49 0.19 5.37
1967 9.23 2.84 1.11 0.27 39.2 6.71 -25.00 17.80 79.06 -23.52 -17.23
1968 12.30 2.33 1.12 0.27 46.1 6.98 -27.00 17.80 84.84 -31.75 -18.79
1969 6.70 1.40 1.09 0.30 40.9 6.85 -23.00 17.80 90.62 -10.39 -3.80
1970 -0.90 -2.35 1.14 0.35 39.7 6.58 -24.00 20.80 89.64 3.07 16.05
1971 -2.54 -5.96 1.15 0.33 48.6 6.92 -23.00 20.80 88.65 10.27 18.16
1972 -3.52 -7.48 1.07 0.29 51.7 6.20 -21.00 20.80 85.64 9.43 26.57
1973 -9.30 -7.14 1.05 0.35 38.3 5.64 -24.00 20.80 82.62 3.17 25.87
1974 -10.65 -5.41 1.30 0.39 26.3 5.49 -27.00 20.80 83.36 1.97 13.20
1975 -8.96 -5.26 1.20 0.35 33.7 5.20 -27.00 20.80 84.09 -2.45 15.61
1976 -4.96 -1.49 0.98 0.26 37.3 4.60 -28.00 20.80 80.11 -4.23 15.59
1977 -0.36 3.03 0.93 0.25 31.9 4.21 -28.00 20.80 76.14 -10.66 4.58
1978 -1.43 1.92 1.02 0.33 31.7 4.04 -29.00 20.80 76.19 -22.14 -4.96
1979 -3.93 -1.85 0.93 0.31 35.4 3.87 -31.00 21.10 76.25 -43.21 -14.28
1980 -4.76 -5.13 0.88 0.32 42.4 3.57 -32.00 21.10 155.0 19.14 76.30 -61.89 -22.11
1981 -8.88 -9.64 0.83 0.32 37.4 3.41 -29.00 21.10 211.0 23.76 76.35 -48.21 -24.93
1982 -9.41 -10.69 0.74 0.28 49.4 3.94 -25.00 21.10 236.0 25.91 76.67 -50.13 -16.90
1983 -8.35 -14.03 0.62 0.21 74.4 4.92 -22.00 21.10 266.0 26.65 82.30 -49.29 -26.20
1984 -14.74 -16.72 0.62 0.28 80.6 5.43 -21.00 21.10 258.0 25.07 80.80 -31.71 -12.51
1985 -12.42 -16.33 0.61 0.29 113.7 6.20 -21.00 21.10 431.0 34.18 81.10 -33.18 -11.03
1986 -12.86 -18.03 0.61 0.32 161.2 7.86 -19.00 21.10 376.0 28.77 81.75 -39.71 -7.32
1987 -16.81 -21.37 0.53 0.28 181.7 8.83 -5.00 20.00 544.0 36.15 82.40 -32.41 -7.78
1988 -19.49 -22.71 0.51 0.27 187.6 8.27 2.00 23.80 531.0 33.42 81.70 -27.25 -7.81
1989 -19.46 -23.64 0.48 0.24 250.5 8.97 1.00 23.80 574.0 35.09 81.10 -24.89 -8.66
1990 -22.46 -25.02 0.54 0.29 233.2 9.08 0.00 23.80 751.0 42.74 81.50 -23.53 -1.02
1991 -20.04 -26.06 0.50 0.24 308.9 9.19 -2.00 23.80 781.0 44.00 82.51 -37.84 -4.58
1992 -20.35 -26.71 0.45 0.20 401.3 10.91 -1.00 23.80 960.0 47.50 81.60 -31.14 -5.32
1993 -20.20 -27.51 0.41 0.19 607.4 14.61 -3.00 24.50 892.0 43.13 78.40 -33.05 -11.48
1994 -23.65 -28.86 0.39 0.19 709.6 17.30 -3.00 24.50 1,213.0 48.42 90.40 -27.56 -7.47
1995 -23.69 -30.71 0.37 0.18 1,024.9 18.69 -3.00 24.50 93.80 -44.67 -15.07
1996 -23.65 -31.28 0.33 0.16 1,470.0 22.05 -3.00 24.50 95.00 -35.55 -9.43
1997 -24.26 -31.67 0.25 0.11 2,018.7 22.94 -7.00 24.50 -22.95 -4.82
1998 -26.01 -32.44 0.18 0.09 2,506.2 23.78 -12.00 24.50 -21.84 1.44
1999 -26.03 -33.63 3,376.7 28.92 -13.00 24.50 -74.90 -33.17
2000 -27.26 -33.47 3,226.9 27.44 24.50 -31.46 -20.56
Table 4.  Statistics for non-characteristics influences on dividends. Correlations, autocorrelations, and unit root tests for non-characteristics time series
influences on dividends. Transaction costs include total one-way trading costs (one-half the average percent bid-ask spread on Dow Jones Industrial Average
stocks plus the average percent commission on round-lot NYSE transactions) and the average percent bid-ask spread on Dow Jones stocks, both from Jones
(2002). The mutual fund share is the aggregate net asset value of U.S. equity mutual funds as a percent share of total NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq market capitalization.
The personal and corporate tax advantage of dividends is the after-tax income received from a dollar in dividends relative to a dollar in long-term capital gains.
The share of options grants as a percent share of total CEO compensation is the mean grant in the Forbes compensation survey divided by the mean total option
grants, salary, and bonus from Hall and Liebman (1998). The prevalence of option plans is the percent of corporations (excluding financials and utilities) with an
executive stock option plan in place and taken from annual Conference Board surveys. The equal-weighted and value-weighted dividend premium are in
percentage terms and taken from Baker and Wurgler (2002). Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix 1. The first column shows the autocorrelation
coefficient and its p-value in brackets, the next two columns show Dickey-Fuller test statistics (with a constant and without a trend term) and an approximate p-
value in brackets for levels and changes, and the remaining columns show the correlations among the variables their p-values in brackets.
Transaction Costs
Mutual
Funds Tax Advantage Options Dividend Premium
r
Levels
Unit
Root
Changes
Unit
Root One-way Spread Share Personal Corp Share Plans EW VW
Transaction Costs
One-way 0.97 0.49 -5.80 1.00
[0.00] [0.98] [0.00]
Spread 0.79 -1.08 -6.44 0.74 1.00
[0.00] [0.72] [0.00] [0.00]
Mutual Funds
Share 0.99 2.73 -4.42 -0.74 -0.82 1.00
[0.00] [1.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Tax Advantage
Personal 0.96 -1.11 -4.25 -0.82 -0.57 0.62 1.00
[0.00] [0.71] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Corp 0.95 -1.23 -7.38 -0.85 -0.56 0.74 0.82 1.00
[0.00] [0.66] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Options
Share 0.87 -1.04 -7.65 -0.88 -0.69 0.87 0.86 0.80 1.00
[0.00] [0.74] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Plans 0.84 -0.94 -4.83 -0.30 -0.19 0.66 0.45 0.46 0.63 1.00
[0.00] [0.78] [0.00] [0.08] [0.27] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Dividend Premium
EW 0.78 -2.57 -6.57 0.62 0.24 -0.35 -0.34 -0.53 0.72 -0.13 1.00
[0.00] [0.10] [0.00] [0.00] [0.16] [0.03] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.47]
VW 0.82 -2.33 -5.50 0.54 0.23 -0.34 -0.30 -0.45 0.76 -0.16 0.94 1.00
[0.00] [0.16] [0.00] [0.00] [0.17] [0.03] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.36] [0.00]
Table 5.  Determinants of the propensity to pay dividends. Univariate regressions of the propensity to pay dividends on non-characteristics influences. Total
one-way trading costs (one-half the average percent bid-ask spread on Dow Jones Industrial Average stocks plus the average percent commission on round-lot
NYSE transactions) and the average percent bid-ask spread on Dow Jones stocks are from Jones (2002). The mutual fund share is the aggregate net asset value of
U.S. equity mutual funds as a percent share of total NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq market capitalization. The personal and corporate tax advantage of dividends is the
after-tax income received from a dollar in dividends relative to a dollar in long-term capital gains. The share of options grants as a percent share of total CEO
compensation is the mean grant in the Forbes compensation survey divided by the mean total option grants, salary, and bonus from Hall and Liebman (1998).
The prevalence of option plans is the percent of corporations (excluding financials and utilities) with an executive stock option plan in place and taken from
annual Conference Board surveys. The value-weighted dividend premium are in percentage terms and taken from Baker and Wurgler (2002). Detailed variable
definitions are in Appendix 1. The first set of regressions runs the level of the propensity to pay on the contemporaneous level of the independent variable. The
second set runs the change in the propensity to pay on the contemporaneous change. The third set runs the change in the propensity to pay on the lagged level.
The levels of the independent variables are standardized to have unit variance. In Panel A, market-to-book is included as a firm characteristic in estimating the
propensity to pay. In Panel B, it is excluded. T-statistics use standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation up to four lags.
ttt ubXaPTP ++= ttt vXbaPTP +D+=D ttt wbXaPTP ++=D -1
1963-2000 1963-1977 1963-2000 1963-1977 1963-2000 1963-1977
Sign b [t] b [t] b [t] b [t] b [t] b [t]
Panel A. M/Bt included
One-way transaction costs + 9.39 [10.5] -4.32 [-0.6] -2.40 [-1.6] -3.26 [-2.2] 0.42 [0.8] 2.14 [0.7]
Bid-ask spread + 5.27 [3.3] -6.64 [-5.9] -2.45 [-4.1] -3.68 [-3.9] 0.15 [0.5] -0.29 [-0.4]
Mutual fund share of assets – -7.80 [-6.3] 29.87 [2.7] 1.00 [0.6] 21.04 [1.2] -0.19 [-0.6] -25.17 [-6.9]
Personal tax advantage + -8.87 [-5.5] -2.90 [-0.5] -1.34 [-1.1] 2.95 [0.6] -0.29 [-0.7] -13.31 [-7.7]
Corporate tax advantage + -10.93 [-12.5] -10.78 [-4.8] -2.37 [-1.4] -7.68 [-7.7] -0.24 [-0.4] -0.36 [-0.2]
Options share of CEO compensation – -5.27 [-9.5] -0.28 [-0.2] 0.68 [2.0]
Option plans – -3.87 [-1.5] -1.35 [-1.0] -0.48 [-0.5] -0.63 [-0.4] -0.91 [-1.3] -2.42 [-4.0]
VW dividend premium + 1.04 [2.4] 1.19 [1.7]
Panel B. M/Bt excluded
One-way transaction costs + 11.63 [15.6] -4.11 [-1.0] 0.39 [0.2] -1.30 [-0.8] 0.48 [1.3] -1.72 [-1.1]
Bid-ask spread + 7.68 [5.2] -4.49 [-9.9] -0.37 [-0.9] -1.03 [-1.6] -0.05 [-0.2] -0.49 [-0.8]
Mutual fund share of assets – -10.12 [-6.7] 0.95 [0.1] -1.42 [-1.0] -8.79 [-0.9] 0.04 [0.1] -20.46 [-12.7]
Personal tax advantage + -11.17 [-6.5] -11.57 [-3.9] -1.76 [-3.3] -2.79 [-2.3] -0.16 [-0.4] -5.93 [-2.8]
Corporate tax advantage + -12.58 [-14.1] -6.22 [-4.2] -0.77 [-0.9] -4.08 [-4.8] -0.28 [-0.8] 0.53 [0.4]
Options share of CEO compensation – -6.80 [-8.8] 0.02 [0.0] 0.58 [2.3]
Option plans – -5.61 [-2.0] -2.39 [-2.7] -0.99 [-1.2] -1.51 [-1.2] -0.26 [-0.5] -1.28 [-2.6]
VW dividend premium + 1.15 [3.2] 1.23 [5.7]
Table 6.  Explaining the post-1978 decline in the propensity to pay with option plans. Actual percent is the
percentage of positive dividend payers in the Compustat sample. Expected percent is the expected percent of
dividend payers based on prevailing sample characteristics. One set of results estimates the expected percent of
payers with a logit model that includes the NYSE market capitalization percentile, the market-to-book ratio, asset
growth, and profitability. The other set excludes market-to-book. The procedure follows Fama and French (2001)
and is described in Appendix 1. The propensity to pay dividends PTP is the difference between the actual and
expected percent. Expected PTP is the forecast value from a second stage regression of the level of the propensity to
pay dividends on the percent of corporations (excluding financials and utilities) with an executive stock option plan
in place, as reported by Conference Board surveys, for 1963-1977. The results of this regression are shown in Panel
B. The level of the independent variable is standardized to have unit variance. T-statistics use standard errors that
are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation up to four lags. Detailed variable and sample definitions are in
Appendix 1.
Panel A. Out of sample forecast of the propensity to pay dividends
M/Bt included
Option plans,
M/Bt included M/Bt excluded
Option plans,
M/Bt excluded
Actual
Percent
Expected
Percent PTP
Expected
PTP
PTP –
Expected
PTP Expected PTP
Expected
PTP
PTP –
Expected
PTP
1978 69.54 70.97 -1.43 1.41 -2.84 67.62 1.92 1.21 0.71
1979 64.75 68.68 -3.93 1.40 -5.33 66.59 -1.85 1.18 -3.03
1980 61.97 66.74 -4.76 1.39 -6.15 67.10 -5.13 1.16 -6.29
1981 55.07 63.96 -8.88 1.37 -10.26 64.72 -9.64 1.14 -10.78
1982 50.15 59.56 -9.41 1.30 -10.71 60.85 -10.69 1.01 -11.70
1983 44.11 52.45 -8.35 -0.01 -8.34 58.13 -14.03 -1.30 -12.73
1984 40.71 55.45 -14.74 0.34 -15.09 57.42 -16.72 -0.68 -16.03
1985 39.24 51.66 -12.42 0.27 -12.70 55.57 -16.33 -0.81 -15.53
1986 34.85 47.71 -12.86 0.12 -12.98 52.88 -18.03 -1.07 -16.96
1987 31.38 48.18 -16.81 -0.03 -16.78 52.75 -21.37 -1.34 -20.03
1988 31.59 51.08 -19.49 0.13 -19.62 54.30 -22.71 -1.05 -21.66
1989 32.31 51.78 -19.46 0.27 -19.74 55.95 -23.64 -0.81 -22.83
1990 32.31 54.77 -22.46 0.18 -22.64 57.33 -25.02 -0.97 -24.05
1991 31.10 51.13 -20.04 -0.05 -19.98 57.16 -26.06 -1.38 -24.68
1992 29.87 50.22 -20.35 0.16 -20.51 56.58 -26.71 -1.01 -25.70
1993 27.32 47.52 -20.20 0.90 -21.10 54.84 -27.51 0.30 -27.81
1994 26.15 49.80 -23.65 -1.88 -21.77 55.01 -28.86 -4.62 -24.24
1995 25.41 49.10 -23.69 -2.67 -21.02 56.12 -30.71 -6.01 -24.70
1996 23.38 47.02 -23.65 -2.95 -20.70 54.66 -31.28 -6.50 -24.78
1997 22.49 46.75 -24.26 54.16 -31.67
1998 22.88 48.90 -26.01 55.33 -32.44
1999 22.64 48.66 -26.03 56.27 -33.63
2000 22.19 49.45 -27.26 55.67 -33.47
Panel B. Regression of levels of the propensity to pay dividends on the prevalence of option plans
M/Bt included M/Bt excluded
1963-2000 1963-1977 1963-2000 1963-1977
Sign b [t] b [t] b [t] b [t]
Option plans – -3.87 [-1.5] -1.35 [-1.0] -5.61 [-2.0] -2.39 [-2.7]
Table 7.  Explaining the post-1978 decline in the propensity to pay with the dividend premium. Actual percent
is the percentage of positive dividend payers in the Compustat sample. Expected percent is the expected percent of
dividend payers based on prevailing sample characteristics. One set of results estimates the expected percent of
payers with a logit model that includes the NYSE market capitalization percentile, the market-to-book ratio, asset
growth, and profitability. The other set excludes market-to-book. The procedure follows Fama and French (2001)
and is described in Appendix 1. The propensity to pay dividends PTP is the difference between the actual and
expected percent. Expected PTP is the forecast value from a second stage regression of the change in the propensity
to pay dividends on the value-weighted dividend premium for 1963-1977. The results of this regression are shown in
Panel B. The level of the independent variable is standardized to have unit variance. T-statistics use standard errors
that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation up to four lags. Detailed variable and sample definitions
are in Appendix 1.
Panel A. Out of sample forecast of the propensity to pay dividends
M/Bt included
Dividend Premium,
M/Bt included M/Bt excluded
Dividend Premium,
M/Bt excluded
Actual
Percent Expected PTP
Expected
PTP
PTP –
Expected
PTP Expected PTP
Expected
PTP
PTP –
Expected
PTP
1978 69.54 70.97 -1.43 -0.57 -0.86 67.62 1.92 -0.36 2.28
1979 64.75 68.68 -3.93 -1.78 -2.16 66.59 -1.85 -1.37 -0.47
1980 61.97 66.74 -4.76 -3.59 -1.17 67.10 -5.13 -3.02 -2.10
1981 55.07 63.96 -8.88 -5.93 -2.96 64.72 -9.64 -5.21 -4.44
1982 50.15 59.56 -9.41 -8.44 -0.97 60.85 -10.69 -7.58 -3.11
1983 44.11 52.45 -8.35 -10.43 2.09 58.13 -14.03 -9.41 -4.62
1984 40.71 55.45 -14.74 -13.03 -1.71 57.42 -16.72 -11.87 -4.84
1985 39.24 51.66 -12.42 -14.73 2.31 55.57 -16.33 -13.40 -2.93
1986 34.85 47.71 -12.86 -16.34 3.48 52.88 -18.03 -14.83 -3.20
1987 31.38 48.18 -16.81 -17.70 0.89 52.75 -21.37 -16.00 -5.37
1988 31.59 51.08 -19.49 -19.08 -0.41 54.30 -22.71 -17.21 -5.50
1989 32.31 51.78 -19.46 -20.47 1.01 55.95 -23.64 -18.41 -5.22
1990 32.31 54.77 -22.46 -21.92 -0.54 57.33 -25.02 -19.68 -5.34
1991 31.10 51.13 -20.04 -22.86 2.83 57.16 -26.06 -20.42 -5.64
1992 29.87 50.22 -20.35 -24.04 3.69 56.58 -26.71 -21.41 -5.30
1993 27.32 47.52 -20.20 -25.27 5.07 54.84 -27.51 -22.45 -5.07
1994 26.15 49.80 -23.65 -26.90 3.25 55.01 -28.86 -23.90 -4.96
1995 25.41 49.10 -23.69 -28.27 4.58 56.12 -30.71 -25.09 -5.62
1996 23.38 47.02 -23.65 -30.14 6.49 54.66 -31.28 -26.79 -4.49
1997 22.49 46.75 -24.26 -31.63 7.37 54.16 -31.67 -28.11 -3.57
1998 22.88 48.90 -26.01 -32.83 6.81 55.33 -32.44 -29.11 -3.33
1999 22.64 48.66 -26.03 -33.61 7.58 56.27 -33.63 -29.69 -3.94
2000 22.19 49.45 -27.26 -36.67 9.41 55.67 -33.47 -32.62 -0.85
Panel B. Regression of changes in the propensity to pay dividends on the value-weighted dividend premium
M/Bt included M/Bt excluded
1963-2000 1963-1977 1963-2000 1963-1977
Sign b [t] b [t] b [t] b [t]
VW dividend premium + 1.04 [2.4] 1.19 [1.7] 1.15 [3.2] 1.23 [5.7]
Table 8. Changes in the propensity to pay dividends: Predicting returns, 1962-2000. Univariate regressions of
future excess returns of dividend payers and nonpayers on the changes in the propensity to pay dividends. The
dependent variable in Panel A is the difference in future real returns between dividend payers and nonpayers. The
dependent variable in Panel B is future real return of dividend payers. The dependent variable in Panel C is the
future real return of nonpayers. rt+k denotes returns in year t+k , and Rt+k denotes cumulative returns from t+1 through
t+k. The independent variable, changes in the propensity to pay dividends, is standardized to have unit variance. In
the regressions reported in the left columns, the propensity to pay is estimated including the market-to-book ratio as
a firm characteristic. In the right columns, it is not. We report OLS coefficients and bias-adjusted (BA) coefficients.
Bootstrap p-values represent a two-tailed test of the null of no predictability.
M/Bt included M/Bt excluded
N OLS BA  [p-val] R2 OLS BA  [p-val] R2
Panel A: Relative returns
rDt+1 – rNDt+1 37 -0.50 -0.91 [0.89] 0.00 -6.03 -5.98 [0.19] 0.05
rDt+2 – rNDt+2 36 -7.11 -7.39 [0.06] 0.08 -15.05 -14.88 [0.00] 0.34
rDt+3 – rNDt+3 35 -6.21 -6.51 [0.15] 0.06 -11.80 -11.96 [0.02] 0.22
RDt+3 – RNDt+3 35 -14.37 -16.10 [0.34] 0.10 -32.68 -32.56 [0.04] 0.47
Panel B: Payer returns
rDt+1 37 -3.56 -3.14 [0.24] 0.04 -3.12 -3.07 [0.34] 0.03
rDt+2 36 -3.19 -3.05 [0.32] 0.03 0.45 0.24 [0.90] 0.00
rDt+3 35 1.72 2.14 [0.58] 0.01 1.84 1.84 [0.62] 0.01
RDt+3 35 -5.13 -4.45 [0.55] 0.04 -0.89 -1.02 [0.92] 0.00
Panel C: Nonpayer returns
rNDt+1 37 -3.06 -2.29 [0.61] 0.01 2.91 2.62 [0.68] 0.01
rNDt+2 36 3.92 4.40 [0.51] 0.01 15.50 15.38 [0.02] 0.18
rNDt+3 35 7.92 8.78 [0.20] 0.05 13.65 13.59 [0.05] 0.14
RNDt+3 35 9.25 12.06 [0.60] 0.03 31.79 32.35 [0.08] 0.32
Table 9. Summary. Summary of the ability of candidate explanations to address non-characteristics trends in dividend payment. Credit for references in media is
given if the explanation (or its central mechanism) receives more than two references in the 1969-2001 sample of New York Times articles that involve dividends.
Credit for addressing time trends in the propensity to pay dividends is given if a proxy variable for the explanation displays a visible trend in the appropriate
direction over that period. Credit for the “out of sample” decline in the propensity to pay is given if at least one empirical proxy can explain the 1978-2000
decline in an empirical framework analogous to Fama and French (2001). Credit for addressing the remaining patterns is based on the discussion in the text. Two
patterns are discussed there: that the recent decline in dividends occurs alongside an increase in the propensity to repurchase; and that changes in the propensity
to pay dividends predict the relative stock returns of dividend payers and nonpayers.
Patterns addressed (X = yes, O = no, . = untested or ambiguous)
Time trends in propensity to pay dividends
Explanation
References
in media
Up
1963-
1966/68
Down
1967/69-
1972/74
Up
1973/75-
1977
Down
1978-2000
(Out of
sample)
Down
1978-2000
Dividends
versus
repurchase
Predict stock
returns
Agency O . . . . . O O
Information asymmetry O O O Xa X O Xa O
Stock options O Ob X c X X Ob X O
Clientele equilibrium
Taxes X O O X O O X O
Transaction costs O O O X Xd O X O
Investment constraints O . . . . . X O
Catering X X Xc X X X X X
Slow learners about taxes X O . O . . X O
a Tax-based models, not investment-based models.
b According to options plan proxy.
c Assuming that the Nixon-era dividend controls caused the decreasing propensity to pay between 1971 and 1972/74.
d According to mutual fund share proxy, not one-way cost or bid-ask spread proxy.
Table A. New York Times references to non-characteristics influences on dividends. References to non-characteristics influences on dividends (as opposed to
earnings or investment opportunities) that appear in the New York Times. Using Factiva, we identify 1,567 unique New York Times articles published between
January 1, 1969 and December 31, 2001 that contain “dividend” or “dividends” at least twice in the abstract. From these 1,567 abstracts, we identify and read the
full text of 103 articles that appear (on the basis of their abstract) to provide an analysis of dividend policy that goes beyond firm characteristics. From these 103
articles, we confirm and record 95 specific references to potential non-characteristics influences on dividends. Appendix 2 describes the article selection
procedure. Below, we list these references in groups according to which explanation for changing propensity to pay dividends that they most closely invoke. (All
references to clientele demands are classified under clientele equilibrium.) The first column counts the number of articles under each explanation. The third
column lists, where appropriate, the specific mechanism invoked by the quotation. The fourth column indicates whether the quotation proposes a link between
the explanation and dividend policy. The fifth column shows the date of the article and, where significant events sufficiently far from the date of the article are
also referenced, dates of those events are listed in parentheses and counted as a separate reference as appropriate. The sixth column shows a summary quotation.
N Explanation Mechanism
Linked to
policy Date Quotation
1 Agency Yes 11/5/1971 “… during the 1960’s there was a great deal of criticism of business corporations
for hanging on to their earnings. … The proclivity … was attacked for a variety of
reasons, including … the growth of executive compensation and perquisites … and
the poor management decision-making that resulted from not having to meet a
market test for capital.”
1 Stock options Yes 10/7/1999 “Option holders benefit from price rises in the stocks of their companies, but not
from dividends … That provides an incentive for companies to hold down
dividends and, instead, distribute money to shareholders by repurchasing stock.”
2 Yes 1/4/2000 “One explanation [for decline in percent of payers in S&P] is … stock options …
arguably providing an incentive to companies not to pay dividends.”
1 Clientele
equilibrium
Taxes
Tax integration
proposal
No 4/10/1975 “Prof. Leo Barnes … favors an amendment to the tax law that would make all
corporate cash dividends deductible … The idea is rapidly gaining support. …
chairman of NYSE came out in favor … Treasury Secretary … has also expressed
his approval.”
2 Tax integration
proposal
No 5/20/1977 “Ironically … as the business pleas [against double taxation of dividends] are
finally getting a sympathetic hearing in the White House and the Congress, many
prominent business executives are … having some reservations …”
3 Tax integration
proposal
No 7/11/1977 “… there have been changes on the tax front, and the promise of more in the wings,
that have put dividends in brighter perspective …”
4 Tax integration
proposal
No 1/3/1978 “… neither proposal [elimination of double taxation of dividends or elimination of
preferential treatment of capital gains] survived … the President … proceeded to
scale down … until the tax package disclosed a few weeks ago had been
transformed into a pale shadow of his campaign promises.”
5 Withholding tax No 3/15/1980 “The Carter Administration announced today that it would propose legislation to
subject interest and dividend payments to income-tax withholding … legislation
faces uncertain prospects on Capital Hill … According to a 1979 I.R.S. study … 9
to 16 percent of interest and dividend income was not reported …”
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6 Clientele
equilibrium
Taxes
(continued)
Withholding tax No 3/23/1980 [Discussion of withholding tax proposals; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
7 Withholding tax No 4/29/1980 [Discussion of withholding tax proposals; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
8 Withholding tax No 5/1/1980 “The House Ways and Means Committee gave a chilly reception to day to
President Carter’s proposal for a 15 percent withholding tax on dividends and
interest …”
9 Tax integration
proposal
No 2/3/1978 “… chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, where tax legislation originates,
proposed [today] that in 1979 and 1980, shareholders be permitted to take a tax
credit that would be ‘generally equal to 10 percent of cash dividends’ … credit
would rise by 2 percentage points a year to 20 percent in 1985 and later.”
10
11
Personal tax
changes
Yes
Yes
2/15/1981
(1978)
“Uncle Sam has contributed to the appeal of nondividend-paying stocks by cutting
the capital gains tax … ‘The 1978 tax cut bill made profits easier to take,’ states
Standard &  Poor’s. ‘The top capital gains rate is now 28 percent; it had been
49.125 percent.’”
12 Personal tax
changes
Yes 9/27/1981 “… With the drop in the rates on unearned income [from a maximum of 70 percent
to a maximum of 50 percent as a result of the new tax law], there is even more of a
reason to pay a dividend.”
13
14
Withholding tax No
No
7/13/1982
(1980)
“The provision in the Senate Finance Committee’s tax bill authorizing the
withholding of income taxes on stock dividends and interest payments, once given
little chance of success, is gaining adherents … Approval …on the House floor
would represent a radical shift of sentiment from the mood of August 1980, when
the House defeated President Carter’s request for interest and dividend withholding
…”
15 Withholding tax No 3/3/1983 [Discussion of withholding tax proposals; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
16 Withholding tax No 3/16/1983 [Discussion of withholding tax proposals; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
17 Withholding tax No 3/17/1983 “The Senate fought to a standoff today on the question of tax withholding …”
18 Withholding tax No 4/4/1983 [Discussion of withholding tax proposals; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
19 Withholding tax No 4/13/1983 [Discussion of withholding tax proposals; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
20 Withholding tax No 4/16/1983 [Discussion of withholding tax proposals; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
21 Withholding tax No 4/17/1983 [Discussion of withholding tax proposals; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
22 Withholding tax No 4/20/1983 “Senate Republicans reached a compromise agreement tonight to postpone for four
years, and perhaps indefinitely, the withholding of taxes from interest and dividend
income.”
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23 Clientele
equilibrium
Taxes
(continued)
Withholding tax No 4/28/1983 [Discussion of withholding tax proposals; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
24 Withholding tax No 5/5/1983 [Discussion of withholding tax proposals; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
25 Withholding tax No 5/13/1983 [Discussion of withholding tax proposals; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
26 Withholding tax No 5/18/1983 “The House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly today to repeal the
withholding of taxes from dividends and interest payments.”
27 Withholding tax No 6/14/1983 [Discussion of withholding tax proposals; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
28
29
Withholding tax No
No
6/17/1983
(1982)
“The Senate voted tonight to repeal a 1982 tax law that would require banks and
corporations to withhold 10 percent of their interest and dividend payments
beginning July 1.”
30 Tax integration
proposal
No 10/28/1985 “…Ways and Means Committee rejected President Reagan’s proposal that
companies be allowed, beginning in 1987, to deduct 10 percent of the cost of
dividends they pay to shareholders. However, the panel decided to put the 10
percent deduction in effect gradually, at the rate of one percentage point a year, so
that it would not be fully effective until 1997.”
31 Personal tax
changes
Yes 6/1/1986 “The Senate Finance Committee bill … would reduce the effective tax rate on
dividends [from 50 to 27 percent], while raising the rate on capital gains [from 20
to 27 percent]. … Pressure will rise on corporations to increase dividend payouts
…”
32 Personal tax
changes
No 9/2/1986 “Prospective changes in the nation’s tax code promise to place the after-tax return
from dividend income virtually on a par, percentage-wise, with the return from
capital gains.”
33 Tax integration
proposal
No 1/26/1989 “The chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission said today that he
favored the elimination of double taxation on dividends.”
34 Tax integration
proposal
No 1/7/1992 “The Treasury [today] proposed to ‘integrate’ corporate and shareholder levies so
earnings would no longer be taxed two or more times …”
35 Personal tax
changes
Yes 1/4/1995 “… many companies … use share repurchases to get money to shareholders. That
is said to be better because dividends are taxed at ordinary income rates, while …
share repurchases … [are, for those who sell] taxed at a rate that now is lower for
many taxpayers and is likely to go down even further if the Republicans … keep a
campaign promise.”
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36 Clientele
equilibrium
Taxes
(continued)
Intercorporate tax
changes
Yes 12/21/1995 “The Clinton Administration has proposed lowering that ‘dividend received
deduction’ [deduction on intercorporate dividends] to 50 percent [from 70 percent],
sending a chill through the market for both new and already issued preferred stocks
… Investors … eagerly snapped up Citicorp’s souped-up preferreds [which
increase the dividend if Congress approves the Administration’s proposal].”
37 Clientele
equilibrium
Investment
constraints
No 2/14/1977 “… pension reform legislation has brought a shift in thinking toward ‘getting a
return’ on investments.”
38 Yes 1/4/2000 “Dividends used to be a virtual requirement … Some institutional investors were
barred from buying stocks that did not pay dividends.”
1 Catering Positive sentiment No 3/16/1975 “At the moment, the investment community seems to be more desirous of receiving
returns in the form of dividends rather than trying for capital appreciation.”
2
3
Positive sentiment
Negative sentiment
No
No
9/13/1976
(late 1960’s)
“During the speculative market of the late 1960’s many brokers told customers that
it didn’t matter whether a company paid a dividend – just so long as its stock kept
going up. … Then came the bear market of 1970 to 1975. … Faith in the growth
theory of investing diminished and when the stock market finally emerged from the
trough there was new respect for those old tried and true dividend-paying shares.”
4 Positive sentiment Yes 11/7/1976 “Thanks to … [characteristics and] the rising yield-consciousness of stockholders,
corporations are fattening their dividend payouts. … As investors became chary of
the stock market, they were less apt to count on future earnings growth … and
more likely to return to the bird-in-the-hand rationale of cash dividends.”
5 Positive sentiment Yes 2/14/1977 “One reason for the strong upturn [in dividends], executives said, is the likelihood
that many companies will be making stock offerings before long to raise money.
Another reason, they said, is that many investors are displaying a growing interest
in stocks with high dividend yields.”
6 Positive sentiment No 5/18/1977 “After years of disappointment – particularly with low-yielding glamour stocks –
investors are emphasizing dividends in their stock selections.”
7 Positive sentiment Yes 7/11/1977 “Companies, looking to attract investors out of the bond market, and to interest
them in a resumption of new equity issues after years of virtually unremittant bear
market, are declaring, resuming and increasing payouts at a record rate. … During
the April-May annual meeting season, the recurring shareholder cry was: ‘Our
stock is way down in price – it might go up if you paid more.’ … Investors appear
to be more interested in current high yield with apparent safety than they are with
possible price appreciation which has not materialized over the last decade …”
8 Positive sentiment No 11/8/1977 “Yields have become an increasingly important consideration for investors …”
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9 Catering
(continued)
Positive sentiment No 11/9/1977 “In a stock market in which income has become a prime consideration, the Phelps
Dodge development [dividend cut] was discouraging for investors and the stock
market.”
10 Negative sentiment No 2/15/1981 “… nondividend payers have become the Big Board’s star performers in recent
years … ‘My sophisticated investors never ask me if a stock pays a cash dividend,’
says Mr. Schaeffer of Bache. ‘They’d much rather have stock dividends than cash
dividends.’”
11 Positive sentiment No 2/5/1984 “Of all the reasons market analysts offer for why investors are building their cash
positions elsewhere, perhaps none is as pertinent as the fact that returns on
Treasury bills and bonds remain greater than the average income from stock
dividends.”
12 Positive sentiment Yes 5/13/1984 “… if interest rates continue to rise … one way companies could continue to lure
investors to the stock market would be by increasing dividends.”
13 Negative sentiment Yes 5/7/1995 “These days, dividends are rising rapidly, but not as fast as stock prices … perhaps
we are witnessing a sea change in investor attitudes. For a generation after the 1929
crash … it was taken for granted that stocks should pay a higher dividend yield
than bonds paid in interest. … Most investors don’t seem to be very interested in
dividends just now. … Maybe dividends simply don’t matter anymore.”
14 Negative sentiment Yes 1/3/1997 “In this buoyant stock market, companies have seen relatively little demand for
higher payouts from shareholders who, after all, have been seeking and getting
capital gains.”
15 Negative sentiment Yes 1/6/1998 “… investors seem to care less and less about dividends. And corporate boards,
seeing no need to part with cash to increase the stock prices of their companies, are
not doing so.”
16
17
18
Negative sentiment
Negative sentiment
Positive sentiment
Yes
Yes
Yes
10/7/1999
(1966-68)
(after 1968)
“What is unusual is that the economy is doing so well even while companies are
growing more reluctant to raise their dividends … the [last] time companies cut
back on dividend increases even as the economy continued to grow is … from
August 1966 through March 1968 … the late-1960’s market, memorably called the
‘the go-go years’ … bears more than a passing resemblance to this one. The stock
market had been going up steadily for the better part of two decades … Mutual
fund managers became media stars … a huge wave of mergers … Dividends can go
so low because investors do not care much about them. It is capital gains that have
made them rich, and it is the pursuit of capital gains that drives stock investments
now.  … After 1968, as it became clear that capital losses were possible, investors
came to value dividends, and the pressure grew on companies to pay them.”
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19
20
Catering
(continued)
Negative sentiment Yes
Yes
1/4/2000
(late 1960’s)
“A growing portion of corporate America appears to be concluding that dividends
are no longer needed to attract investors … decline [in percent of payers in S&P]
also reflects an investor attitude that puts little pressure on companies to make
payouts. … The only similar trend occurred in the late 1960’s, another time that
small technology companies were all the rage and the market for new issues was
red hot. A variety of reasons are given for the trend away from dividends, including
the tax disadvantages … but that has always been true, and the effect presumably
should have been greater two decades ago, when tax rates were much higher …
The most likely explanation … would seem to be the most obvious. Investors, after
seeing year after year of huge capital gains, no longer see much of a need for
dividends as an assured return if the market declines … ”
21 Negative sentiment No 8/6/2000 “Today’s investors, fixated on making a quick buck, are likely to wonder how
anyone could ever have been interested in something so obviously irrelevant as
dividends.”
1 Slow learning
about taxes
Yes 5/13/1984 “… there is a growing sentiment that the role of dividends should be played down
and that cash payouts, because they are taxed more highly than long-term capital
gains, are actually a very costly way to compensate shareholders. … despite the
argued drawbacks to dividends, specialists agree that groups of investors such as
retirees, wealthy individuals whose income is mostly sheltered, and nontax-paying
organizations, are most likely to prefer high-dividend stocks.”
2 Yes 1/6/1998 “The [newly] low payout ratio could be an indication that companies prefer to pay
cash to holders through share repurchases, which are taxed differently for holders.”
3 Yes 1/24/1999 “So why the [recent] corporate stinginess when it comes to payouts? One reason is
that companies know many investors simply aren’t interested in dividends, because
they are well aware of the income taxes they will owe on such payouts.”
4 Yes 1/4/2000 “A variety of reasons are given for the trend away from dividends … some
companies say they instead return money to shareholders by repurchasing shares,
allowing the sellers to pay lower capital gains tax rates on the money.”
5 Yes 2/6/2000 “… capital gains have grown as a share of all income, but dividends have not. The
results show tax policy at work. … Federal tax law discourages dividends …”
1 Other Nixon controls on
dividends
Yes 11/3/1971  “A guideline limiting increases in corporation dividends to 4 per cent was
announced today by the committee regulating interest and dividends in the second
phase of President Nixon’s economic stabilization program. … freeze on dividends
has … been voluntary. However, the administration put heavy pressure on
corporations to comply … ”
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2 Other
(continued)
Nixon controls on
dividends
Yes 11/5/1971 “Phase One of the Administration’s anti-inflation program slated to end next week
… Phase One … the President simply asked corporations to hold dividends at
existing levels; this the vast majority of corporations were delighted to do. For
Phase two … requested corporations not to increase total dividends per share by
more than 4 per cent …”
3 Nixon controls on
dividends
Yes 5/7/1972 [Discussion of dividend controls; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
4 Nixon controls on
dividends
Yes 4/25/1973 [Discussion of dividend controls; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
5 Nixon controls on
dividends
Yes 9/22/1973 [Discussion of dividend controls; no policy shifts or revealing detail.]
6 Inflation hedge Yes 4/30/1974 “He [Consolidated Edison shareholder] said at the last stockholders’ meeting [at
which Con Ed omitted its dividend] it was ‘appalling’ to see all of those old people
whose principal had been cut in half at that time while the dividend was static in
the face of ‘runaway inflation.’”
7 Inflation hedge No 2/24/1976 “A number of investors asked analysts whether A.T.&T. and corporations generally
are raising dividends sufficiently to keep pace with inflation.”
8 Inflation hedge No 3/25/1977 [Discussion of dividends as a hedge against inflation.]
9 Inflation hedge No 9/1/1982 [Discussion of dividends as a hedge against inflation.]
10 Inflation hedge No 4/2/1994 [Discussion of dividends as a hedge against inflation.]
11 DRIPs No 3/4/1975 “… recent … renewed interest in dividend investment plans … The latest versions
of these plans contain features … all designed to make dividend reinvestment more
attractive to the average shareowner.”
12 DRIPs No 9/17/1976 “About 750 corporations … have begun dividend reinvestment programs in recent
years, and the list continues to grow.”
13 DRIPs No 10/23/1976 “The biggest such [dividend reinvestment] plan is that of the American Telephone
and Telegraph Company. … The plan has proved so popular that it generates a
substantial amount of capital for the Bell System.”
14 DRIPs No 9/4/1977 “Individual investors … are accumulating shares by reinvesting their dividends at a
record clip.”
15 DRIPs No 8/20/1978 “… it is only in the last two to five years that the concept [of dividend reinvestment
plans] has caught on with corporate America. … At present, it is estimated that
only some 10 to 15 percent of the eligible dividends are being reinvested.”
16 DRIPs No 12/23/1978 [Discussion of features of dividend reinvestment plans.]
17 DRIPs No 8/7/1988 [Discussion of features of dividend reinvestment plans.]
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18 Other
(continued)
Repurchases Yes 1/4/1995 “Bulls … note that many companies … use share repurchases [instead of
dividends] to get money to shareholders.”
19 Repurchases Yes 5/7/1995 “The old record [for low aggregate dividend yield] was 2.64 percent set in August
1987. Then, as now, Wall Street experts were reassuring about why you shouldn’t
worry. The dividend yield figures were misleadingly low because they did not
include stock buybacks by companies, which were running at a high level …
Buybacks are now running at an even higher level.”
20 Repurchases Yes 1/3/1997 “… many companies argue that [they are not raising dividends because] they are
effectively returning money to shareholders by repurchasing their own shares.”
21 Repurchases Yes 1/6/1998 “The low payout ratio could be an indication that companies prefer to pay cash to
holders through share repurchases …”
22 Repurchases Yes 10/7/1999 “That [executive stock options] provides an incentive for companies to hold down
dividends and, instead, distribute money to shareholders by repurchasing stock.
Such stock repurchases are popular and many companies have borrowed money to
buy back stock.”
23
24
Repurchases Yes
Yes
11/7/1999
(since mid-
1980’s)
“Many Wall Street analysts believe that this parsimony [decline in the number of
dividend payers] has been caused by the increasing popularity – since the mid-
1980’s – of companies’ share repurchase programs.  … But Professors Fama and
French dismiss that view. They found that buyback plans have, almost exclusively,
been the province of dividend-paying large-cap companies.”
25 Repurchases Yes 1/4/2000 “A variety of reasons are given for the trend away from dividends … some
companies say they instead return money to shareholders by repurchasing shares …
but in many cases those purchases only offset the shares being issued to employees
who exercise options.”
26
27
Repurchases Yes 8/6/2000
(since early
1980’s)
“The prime suspect in the model’s demise [the declining predictive power of the
dividend yield] has been corporate share repurchase programs. Such programs were
quite rare as recently as the early 1980’s, but they have since grown so much …
Therefore, the argument goes, record low dividends simply reflect a shift in how
corporations distribute their earnings … but two finance professors, Eugene Fama
… and Kenneth French … contend that this argument does not completely solve
the mystery … “
28 Repurchases No 1/3/2001 “… number of companies announcing plans to buy back their own shares has fallen
during the last several months …”
